Voices from the Arab press: Iranian calamities, Netanyahu's rule, and state legitimacy

Iran and the Greater CalamityNida Al-Watan, Lebanon, July 18For more stories from The Media Line go to themedialine.orgDespair now governs the behavior of an Iran unable to restrain the blows being dealt to it by the American “Great Satan.” It has therefore widened the scope of its attacks on Arab countries and sought to disrupt the global economy by tampering with vital maritime passages.The Iranian regime is confronting a dangerous plan unlike anything it has faced before. Should that plan reach its conclusion, it could dismantle the pillars of Iran’s power, sever the limbs of its regional proxies, clip the wings that have enabled it to manipulate the Arab world, and undermine the foundations of its influence over a state it controls through repression, arrests, and executions.Perhaps it is this relatively new threat that is driving the regime toward suicidal measures at this particular moment, whether by destabilizing the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab al-Mandab Strait or by inviting even greater hostility from its regional surroundings.Its calculation oscillates between “I am already drowning, so why fear getting wet?” and “After me, the flood.”This is especially true because Iran now finds itself facing an American president remarkably skilled at employing methods that may appear random on the surface, while developments on the ground reveal an ability to move pieces across the regional chessboard through shocks that strike without mercy.These methods have also disrupted the inherited Persian skill of weaving crises like carpets, exploiting them, and converting them into gains and victories. They have unsettled Iran’s management of both war and negotiation, depriving it of the patience and maneuvering room that once allowed it to accumulate cards, play the long game, and eventually expand its control and influence.Perhaps what has most destabilized the Iranian regime is the loss of its strongest card: Lebanon, through Hezbollah.The new element is not merely the direct negotiations between the Lebanese state and Israel, but Hezbollah’s inability to register any achievement against Israel that Iran could exploit.It is Hezbollah’s defeat and total inability to confront Israel - not the negotiations themselves - that has pushed Iran to cross every red line in an attempt to regain its balance and continue negotiating while preserving a facade of strength before its own people and maintaining its ability to intimidate its Arab neighbors.More importantly, the Iranian regime cannot survive in an environment of stability and genuine democratic political participation. In this, it resembles all ideological totalitarian regimes that exploit religious beliefs, molding them to suit agendas of power and using them to control adherents at home and abroad.Iran therefore wants negotiations not to end its struggle with the “Great” and “Little Satans,” but to preserve enemies useful to the regime’s future, strengthen its grip over its people, and continue its destructive activity across the Arab world.Yet the latest changes have stripped those enmities of much of their usefulness and shattered the euphoria produced by the memorandum of understanding. Iran has lost its compass and is sinking into the greater calamity. God help us. - Sana AljakIsraeli hostage negotiation team, headed by Uri Lubrani (L), leaves meeting with UN secretary-general Javier Peres de Cuellar (2nd L) regarding missing Israeli servicemen in Lebanon, in Geneva, July 1991. (credit: Mike Marucci/Reuters)Iran Wants Negotiations Never To EndAsharq al-Awsat, UK, July 17Whenever the US and Iran move closer to the negotiating table, the same question returns: Can a lasting agreement ever be reached with the Islamic Republic, or does each round of talks simply become another station in an endless conflict?The experience since the 1979 revolution suggests that relations between the two sides have never known real stability. Instead, they have moved from one crisis to another and from one negotiating round to the next, each more complicated than the last.Today, escalation has returned, along with contacts between Washington and Tehran mediated by several countries, most notably Oman, Qatar, Turkey, Pakistan, and Egypt, in an effort to contain tensions and prevent the region from sliding into a wider confrontation. But the path is far from easy, because each side enters the negotiations with objectives fundamentally different from the other’s.Many experts believe negotiating with Iran differs from conventional diplomacy not only because of the issues at stake, but because of the nature of the regime itself, which blends religious, political, military, security, and even deeply ingrained behavioral considerations. Any agreement therefore extends beyond a single issue and into a broad network of regional and international interests.The late Israeli diplomat Uri Lubrani, Israel’s last ambassador to Iran before the revolution, was among those who repeatedly warned against underestimating Iranian negotiating ability. He described Iranians as “a nation of carpet weavers and chess players,” referring to their patience and ability to think several moves ahead. Tehran, in his view, does not treat negotiations as a rapid path to agreement, but as a means of improving its political position and buying time. He even called its negotiating style “a masterpiece in deceiving the world.”Whether one agrees with that judgment or not, it reflects the impression held by many diplomats who have dealt with Iran over the past several decades.One of the most distinctive features of Iranian policy is its ability to pursue several tracks simultaneously. Iran negotiates while preserving multiple instruments of pressure through its regional influence, military and security files, and capacity to affect shipping and energy flows in the Gulf.Tehran is therefore careful never to enter negotiations stripped of leverage.This is where mediating states become important. They do more than transmit messages; they narrow differences, open discreet channels, and ease tensions when talks reach an impasse. Turkey has accumulated considerable experience in this field through its diplomatic and security services, while Pakistan has strengthened its role by hosting meetings and helping the parties keep dialogue alive despite profound disagreements.These countries do not regard mediation as diplomacy alone, but as an opportunity to enhance their regional and international standing. Each success gives them more political weight and greater influence over other files.Iran, meanwhile, understands that time may be among its strongest assets. The longer negotiations continue, the greater the pressure on the other parties, whether because of security concerns, volatility in energy markets, or domestic political calculations. For this reason, many analysts believe the Iranian leadership does not view time as a burden but as a card to be invested in pursuit of better terms.The American administration faces different pressures. It must demonstrate that it can prevent military escalation while avoiding concessions that could appear excessive to the American public. Any development in the Middle East can also affect domestic politics, particularly as elections approach, narrowing Washington’s room for maneuver.The difficulty of the negotiations is not limited to the nuclear file. It also includes the future of economic sanctions, Iran’s regional role, security of navigation in the Gulf, and relations with Washington’s allies. A comprehensive settlement therefore requires addressing interconnected files, each governed by its own calculations.Iran itself faces internal challenges that cannot be ignored. Its economy has suffered under sanctions for years, foreign investment remains limited, and inflation and rising prices continue to burden citizens. The state also needs significant resources for reconstruction and to compensate for losses caused by the recent war.Tehran therefore needs economic relief, but wants it without appearing to have surrendered its standing or influence.Washington, for its part, understands that an agreement lacking clear guarantees may amount to little more than a temporary truce.Talks consequently proceed with great caution, each side testing the other’s intentions before taking larger steps. The central question remains whether diplomacy can bring this long conflict to an end. So far, there is no definitive answer.History shows that US-Iranian relations have passed through repeated periods of rapprochement and tension, and that previous agreements have not prevented crises from returning. The current phase is therefore another test of diplomacy’s ability to achieve a genuine breakthrough.Success will depend not only on what is said inside the negotiating room, but also on political, security, and economic developments outside it.Ultimately, the greatest challenge may not be signing another agreement but preserving it and converting it into lasting stability in a region where temporary settlements so often become the seeds of new crises. - Huda al-HusseiniPrime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu attends a Knesset session before it dissolves ahead of elections, in Jerusalem, July 16. (credit: RONEN ZVULUN/REUTERS)Will Netanyahu Step Down?El Watan, Egypt, July 16Israelis often refer to Benjamin Netanyahu as “King Bibi” or “Bibi forever.” Bibi is the affectionate nickname given to this butcher who committed the crime of genocide in Gaza, while “forever” reflects the fact that he has served longer as prime minister than anyone else in Israel’s history, surpassing David Ben-Gurion, the founder of the state and its first prime minister in the year of the Nakba, 1948.Yesterday, the Knesset decided that parliamentary elections would be held in October, setting the stage for another dramatic transformation in Israeli politics. These elections will be more than a renewal of parliamentary authority. They will amount to a broad public referendum on a political career spanning more than two decades and on one man who has come to symbolize Israeli politics in the 21st century.Netanyahu was born in Tel Aviv in 1949 and was the first Israeli prime minister born in occupied Palestine. He is a historic phenomenon, having served for more than 17 years across three periods: 1996-1999, 2009-2021, and in his current term beginning in December 2022. His longevity has given him an exceptional place in Israeli political history.Netanyahu also has a military background. He served in the elite General Staff Reconnaissance Unit and participated in operations including the 1968 raid on Beirut airport and the 1973 October War. He later studied architecture and business administration at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.His real political rise began when he was appointed Israel’s ambassador to the UN in the mid-1980s, after which he entered the Knesset with the Likud and steadily climbed to the top of the political system. His ambition has not diminished.Today he faces the most difficult political battle of his career, amid accusations that he failed to prevent Oct. 7, described by the Israeli opposition as the country’s greatest intelligence failure in 50 years.Nevertheless, Netanyahu insists on remaining in power and has declared his intention to form a broad government that is neither Right nor Left, in an effort to attract a wider electorate and move beyond the criticism directed at him.The election field includes several rivals from different political currents, all united by one objective: removing Netanyahu and opening a new chapter in Israeli politics.At the forefront stands former [IDF] chief of staff Gadi Eisenkot, who founded his Yashar Party in 2025. Recent polls show Eisenkot surpassing Netanyahu for the first time as the figure considered best suited to serve as prime minister, reflecting a shift in public sentiment toward military leaders during wartime.Former prime minister Naftali Bennett poses no less of a threat. He combines a military background in the General Staff Reconnaissance Unit, entrepreneurship in the technology sector, and roots in religious Zionism and the settlement movement.Bennett, who once headed the settlers’ council, demonstrated his ability to assemble a governing coalition in 2021 that ended 12 consecutive years of Netanyahu’s rule. Although his government collapsed after only a year, he remains attractive to right-wing voters seeking a less polarizing and more pragmatic alternative.There is also Yair Lapid, the former journalist turned politician who represents the liberal Center. He founded Yesh Atid in 2012 and quickly became one of Netanyahu’s most prominent opponents. Lapid briefly served as prime minister in 2022 under a rotation agreement with Bennett and continues to wage fierce opposition to Netanyahu’s policies.Avigdor Liberman, leader of the secular nationalist Yisrael Beytenu Party, is another significant figure. Once close to Netanyahu, he has become one of his harshest critics.Liberman represents a hardline secular current opposed to the privileges granted to ultra-Orthodox Jews and supports drafting them into the military, placing him in direct conflict with Netanyahu and his haredi allies.Yet the election raises a question larger than Netanyahu’s political survival: the future of the Zionist project and its strategic direction.Netanyahu belongs to the hawkish school of Israeli politics and embraces an expansionist vision associated with the idea of Greater Israel. This vision, promoted by far-Right parties, reflects a determination to retain control over the West Bank and an absolute rejection of Palestinian statehood.But this outlook is not Netanyahu’s alone. Most of his rivals on the Right and Center, including Eisenkot, Bennett, and Liberman, hold similarly hardline security positions and differ little in the substance of their policies toward the Palestinians. Their disagreements are primarily over style, method, and the degree of polarization.The election will also carry major consequences for the wider Middle East, particularly amid the war with Iran and growing speculation that Israel may strike Iranian nuclear facilities.Such a scenario appears more likely if Netanyahu remains in office, as Iran has long been one of his highest priorities. An Eisenkot or Bennett government might adopt different tactics, though not necessarily a different strategic objective.In the Arab world, the outcome could affect the future of normalization. Netanyahu was the principal driver of the Abraham Accords, but his continued rule alongside far-Right allies could complicate relations with Arab states that reject his policies toward the Palestinians.In Gaza, however, the elections are unlikely to produce a major shift. Nearly all Israeli political forces hold hardline positions toward the Strip, and the assault could continue or intensify under any government. The only difference may be the scale of escalation and the size of ground operations.Should Netanyahu lose, his fate may be harsh. He would face not only accusations of political and security failure, but corruption charges and legal cases that could regain momentum once he loses political protection. His defeat could bring a long political era to an end, reorder Israel’s party system, and open the door to a new generation.If he survives, expansionist and escalatory policies will continue, perhaps with an even stronger alliance with religious and ultranationalist parties, pushing Israel toward greater international isolation and internal conflict.The 2026 Knesset elections will therefore be a defining moment. They are not merely a contest over parliamentary seats, but a struggle over the identity and future of the state: whether Israel will continue along Bibi’s path toward Greater Israel or seek a new course that may differ in style but not greatly in substance.In every scenario, the Palestinian issue will remain hostage to Israel’s internal struggle, with no fundamental change in policy toward the Palestinians visible on the horizon, regardless of which faces and names prevail. - Refa’at RashadThose demanding respect for state must first ask why citizens don’t feel itAl Mada, Iraq, July 16Iraqi politicians often declare that the country’s new federal and democratic model differs from the monarchies of the region, particularly in the Gulf. By that logic, Iraq should resemble European democracies.Yet since living in Europe, I have noticed something I did not experience in Iraq: respect for the state does not begin with fear or with official slogans about prestige.It begins in the smallest details of daily life. At the university, hospital, government office, and on the street, citizens feel an unwritten bond with institutions telling them: you are part of this state, and this state exists for you.So, when an Iraqi says, “The state is not respected,” the first question should not be why he used those words, but what experience produced them.Angry language is often the accumulated result of years in which people found no other way to make themselves heard. The state is not a portrait on a wall, a slogan in an office, or a collection of institutions with grand names. It is the daily relationship between the citizen and justice.The problem begins when anger becomes the only language they believe will be heard.One of our deepest mistakes has been to confuse the state with those in power. The state is not the person occupying office, the government that will eventually change, or the official holding temporary authority. It is larger than individuals and must endure after they leave.Criticizing a government or official is therefore not necessarily hostility toward the state. At times, criticism of authority is a defense of the state itself. Regardless, the state’s prestige does not come from silencing angry voices, but from building trust.Equally important: why are citizens always asked to reconsider their words, while authorities are rarely asked to reconsider their actions? In mature democracies, a political apology is not a weakness.Power is not an entitlement, but a burden borne before society. Iraqis, however, have lived for years with difficult questions: Where is justice? Where is the protection of rights? Where is accountability for corruption? Where is genuine citizenship? Where is the official who stands before the public when failure occurs?These questions arose from daily experience. A citizen who cannot find clean water, a dignified hospital, a school that offers his children a future, secure employment, safe streets, or decent public spaces does not experience the state as an abstract constitutional idea.The question of respecting the state therefore cannot be separated from another: Has the state respected its citizens? Has it respected the blood of those who protested for their rights, families who lost their children, workers without proper contracts, citizens waiting in government offices for what is theirs, elderly women struggling to survive, children with nowhere to spend the summer, or retirees standing in line when salaries are delayed?The problem is the enormous distance between the state as a beautiful sovereign concept promoted by influencers in campaigns funded by officials implicated in corruption, and the state as people experience it through relentless daily suffering.An official is not sacred. He is a public employee whose legitimacy comes from serving people. No authority is above questioning, and no office grants moral immunity from error. Yet in Iraq, apologies often travel in only one direction.Iraq has known a period when every dissenting voice was treated as a threat to the state. Experience proved that silencing people does not create genuine respect; it creates temporary quiet while crises remain beneath the surface. A critical voice is not always an enemy of the state. It may be evidence that citizens still want a better one.The real danger is not the citizen who asks questions, but the citizen who has lost the desire to ask. Societies do not collapse only when angry voices rise; they also collapse when people stop believing change is possible.Citizens do not want a state that demands verbal expressions of love. They want a state they can feel in the details of everyday life. Before asking why a citizen said the state is not respected, perhaps we should ask what the state has done to make him believe it deserves respect. - Ahmed Hassan Translated by Asaf Zilberfarb. 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