Russia denies fresh mobilisation plans as analysts warn of post-election call-up and citizens research how to leave the country (Ukraine Battlefield update, Day 1,617)

Every day, the Ukraine Battlefield update newsletter offers a clear look at how the war is unfolding on the ground. Subscribe for free here to get the full text delivered to your inbox. Everyone is talking about it, but Moscow insists it will not happen: Russian propagandists deny that mobilisation is being planned. It is almost inevitable, both a Russian and a German analyst said. Let us postpone it until after the elections: Russian outlet Viorstka has compiled a list of everything Russian authorities and citizens fear in autumn 2026 alongside mobilisation. Will mobilisation solve Putin’s problems? Probably not, a historian said, warning of the lost advantage of the world’s largest country. Map of the day: a suspicious bridge between Russia and North Korea. Videos of the day: a refinery and a Wildberries warehouse burn in Ryazan; an attack on a Russian drone at a record altitude. Everyone is talking about it, but Moscow insists it will not happen. When the Kremlin denies something, it is especially worth paying attention. It lied when it said it would not occupy Crimea; it lied when it claimed it would not launch a full-scale war against Ukraine; and it lied when it denied poisoning Alexei Navalny, starting the war in Donbas, or shooting down flight MH17 with 298 people on board. One of Russia’s most aggressively anti-Western politicians, former prime minister and president Dmitry Medvedev, felt compelled to deny reports of a new mobilisation. According to independent Russian media, it could begin as early as autumn, immediately after the Duma so-called elections. According to the deputy chairman of Russia’s Security Council, these are all rumours and a paid propaganda campaign aimed at destabilising the situation in the country. Russia, unlike Ukraine, allegedly has enough soldiers. He said that around 200,000 people signed contracts with the defence ministry in the first half of this year. Russians apparently do not see it that way and have therefore begun googling more than at any time since the start of the full-scale war, including where they can travel without visas and how quickly they can obtain a passport, as the independent Russian channel Mozhem Obyasnit found. In July, it said, Moscow residents also began complaining en masse that they were unable to obtain passports because of a lack of available appointments. As German economist Janis Kluge explained for the website Vazhnyye Istorii, between 800 and 1,000 people a day signed contracts with the defence ministry in the first quarter of this year — a decline of up to 20 percent compared with the same period last year. The following Viorstka chart also clearly shows the decline in recruitment: Illustration — Viorstka For example, it shows that Moscow sent 1,708 contract soldiers to the front in April and 1,378 in May. “That is 1,000 fewer than last year and comparable with figures for 2024, when the capital had not yet introduced million-rouble payments for contracts with the defence ministry,” the Russian website wrote. The fact is that for several months, the Russian army has been advancing very slowly at the cost of enormous losses, which it cannot replace through recruitment. The pool of people willing to enter the “meat grinder” in exchange for generous contracts has gradually been exhausted. Moreover, burning Russian tankers, refineries and Wildberries warehouses deep inside Russian territory not only seriously threatens the image of the Russian regime, but above all drains its war budget. Military analysts consulted by the Russian website Current Time assessed the slow Russian summer offensive, focused mainly around three cities — Kostiantynivka, Lyman and Dobropillia — as follows: since the beginning of the year, both sides have gained roughly the same amount of territory, 700 square kilometres. With an estimated 450,000 dead and 1.4 million wounded, declining volunteer recruitment, and Russian forces making only incremental territorial gains, a new army is needed, analyst Julia Davis wrote. She also recalled the words of propagandist Vladimir Solovyov, who is likewise irritated by rumours about mobilisation. “Everyone is talking about ‘mobilisation, mobilisation’,” Solovyov said recently, calling for so-called Z-bloggers to be prosecuted for spreading panic. It is almost inevitable, both a Russian and a German analyst said. Several independent Russian media outlets, including Meduza and Vazhnyye Istorii, reported as early as June, citing sources close to the Kremlin and security services, that something was being prepared for autumn. The final decision on whether and how a new mobilisation would take place has not yet been made. According to Russian analyst and historian Sergei Lukashevsky, there is a very high probability that limited mobilisation will begin after the “electoral event” — the September 2026 State Duma elections. “I would even venture to say that it is almost inevitable,” he told Denník N. Austrian military expert Gustav Gressel sees it similarly. “It appears to be approaching. Extensive secret preparations are underway,” he told Denník N. As ISW wrote in its latest report, this will be a highly personal decision for Vladimir Putin, also dependent on his ability to assess the situation on the battlefield realistically. Mobilisation carries numerous risks, including a new wave of mass emigration and a further decline in the president’s popularity. Putin has sought to distance himself as much as possible from the failures of the “special military operation”. Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky also spoke about Russian mobilisation a few days ago, based on information from Ukraine’s own intelligence services. In an interview with Sky News, he said that Putin would be planning to mobilise between 300,000 and 500,000 men. However, he would not be able to train them quickly or properly, meaning that high Russian losses would continue, Zelensky said. German military analyst Julius Röpcke, who wrote for Bild for many years, argued that such figures are realistic. According to him, Russia might also try to follow Ukraine’s approach, in which drones are increasingly replacing manpower, or establish more strike centres with ballistic missiles. If that failed, however, the mobilisation mentioned above could be considered. He estimated that it would take six months before its effects became apparent at the front. According to Lukashevsky, the main problem with the Kremlin’s system for recruiting contract soldiers is not that the number of new recruits has begun to decline slightly, but the quality of the available human resources. Increasingly, contracts are being signed by older people with low social and professional status, often including convicted criminals. “In 2025, 44 percent of confirmed Russian military deaths were men aged between 45 and 55,” Lukashevsky said, a claim also supported by Viorstka. Many newly recruited soldiers are unfit for combat. “They are criminals, and they are already so old and sick that they can barely stand on their feet. They are people who hang around bars and, until recently, were sleeping on the streets. They are a burden to everyone. What can they be trained to do? They cannot even wear uniforms; they can barely carry 20 kg. They are single-use,” the website quoted a military source as saying. Moreover, according to Lukashevsky, the weakest point of today’s Russian army is not its infantry, but its drone-operating forces. As he added, attempts to recruit university students into contract service have largely failed. “Meanwhile, the list of Ukrainian drone targets continues to expand and now includes logistics hubs and cargo vessels. Ordinary riflemen are among the least effective means of defending against drones, yet even this basic level of protection cannot be provided for all vulnerable sites,” the Russian expert said. According to Viorstka, the elite Rubicon drone unit is also facing problems recruiting personnel for more demanding roles. Lukashevsky predicts that, given public unease, this would be a partial and gradual mobilisation. Such a move would not require an extensive campaign, he said. “Since September 2022, the authorities have carried out extensive preparatory work. It is certainly possible that the new electronic registers will reveal serious problems once they are put into operation — but that may not be the case. It appears that, at least, the Kremlin believes everything is ready,” he said. As ISW noted, Putin had already, at the end of last year, “signed a law changing the administrative process of Russian military conscription to a year-round cycle instead of the previous biannual cycles, thereby significantly increasing the rate at which Russia could summon and process larger numbers of conscripts and reservists”. What could happen “after the elections”? The Kremlin is laying the groundwork through several measures for a mobilisation that could take place in a hybrid or undeclared form. The Russian website Viorstka compiled a list of unpopular measures that officials, experts and the Russian public fear could follow the elections: Elements of limited martial law. A presidential decree would be enough to introduce them. This could involve freezing the activities of political parties or public organisations, a complete ban on protests and elections, the introduction of total censorship, the right to mobilise civilians, or the right to confiscate property. The website quoted two political strategists working with the Kremlin who support this option, saying that “some security officials have long believed that we must stop grovelling” to the population and “fight with the whole country”. A failure at the front or in recruiting soldiers could serve as a trigger. As it noted, martial law is already in force in four occupied parts of Ukraine. Mobilisation. The Russian journalists’ sources said the exact opposite of what Medvedev has claimed, recalling that the previous wave of mobilisation was also prepared in the strictest secrecy and that Putin personally made the decision together with the leadership of the defence ministry and the general staff. Efforts to encourage people to fight against Ukraine are also reflected in the increase in the payment from two million roubles to 2.9 million in the Novosibirsk region, where recruitment is not progressing at the pace demanded from above. “We have one of the lowest numbers of contracts in the country. They made it clear that if we do not submit the required figures by August, something drastic will happen,” Viorstka quoted a source in the regional government as saying, adding that there was a shortage of money and allegedly even uniforms. Seizure of deposits. There is speculation about the confiscation of citizens’ savings, for example through their forced conversion into war bonds. Both the finance minister and the central bank governor have denied this. Exit visas. A law is reportedly being prepared that would introduce new strict rules. For example, individual travel would be permitted only to selected countries. Russian diplomacy has denied this, although certain restrictions are already in force. A complete VPN ban. For several months, the regime has been intensifying efforts to restrict services that Russians use to circumvent internet censorship. New repressive measures. New economic measures, such as sharp increases in petrol and diesel prices, or the abolition of benefits and higher social contributions. Could it work? Experts are sceptical. Austrian expert Gustav Gressel doubts whether mobilisation would solve Russia’s problems on the battlefield. “From an operational perspective, the Russians have not yet found a way of turning larger numbers of people into greater progress,” he said. However, it will not be easy for Ukraine either. “Killing all those poor souls will be difficult. Will they open new avenues of advance in order to overwhelm the Ukrainian defenders? Yes. But I do not think it will work,” he said. At the same time, he said, it can be assumed that ballistic strikes will play an important role in attacks on cities and that the coming winter will be even harder than the last. According to Gressel, Moscow will seek to secure Ukraine’s capitulation through such a combined assault, but will not succeed. As Lukashevsky pointed out, mobilisation is not merely a matter of replenishing military ranks. “For Putin, it represents a fundamental strategic crossroads. The war has reached a stalemate,” the Russian historian said. Russia still has the upper hand on the battlefield, but it may have lost — probably for the first time in its history — its greatest strategic advantage: a secure strategic rear. “Hitler reached Moscow and Stalingrad, but he could not bomb Saratov, Kazan or Nizhny Novgorod. Ukraine can do that today. Ukrainian drones have reached as far as Tyumen and Omsk. Oil and gas facilities in western Siberia are further potential targets,” Lukashevsky said. As he noted, Russia has historically often been vulnerable at its borders and during offensive campaigns — from Peter the Great’s defeat at Narva, through Tukhachevsky’s defeat near Warsaw, to the Crimean War and the Russo-Japanese War. “However, the country’s vast interior has always remained an extensive, secure hinterland. As a character in a satirical play by the Ukrainian-born writer Nikolai Gogol said in the first half of the nineteenth century: ‘From here, you could ride on horseback for three years and not reach another country.’” According to Lukashevsky, anyone who penetrated deep into Russia almost inevitably encountered insurmountable logistical problems and ultimately suffered defeat — a lesson learned by Charles XII of Sweden, Napoleon and Hitler alike. Ukraine has largely avoided these dangers by striking Russia’s rear areas from a distance. According to Lukashevsky, Putin essentially has two options. One is to begin peace negotiations in the foreseeable future — by next spring at the latest. The other is to declare mobilisation with a capital M: not merely another call-up of reservists, but the full mobilisation of the country. However, he is also sceptical about whether it would work. In his view, Russia’s defence ministry cannot equip and train significantly more new military formations than those that already exist, particularly formations adapted to the realities of modern warfare — above all drone warfare — in order to substantially expand the front. For these reasons, Russian political scientist Ivan Preobrazhensky is also sceptical about mobilisation in Russia. “No one will impose an additional burden on the population unless there is 100-percent certainty that mobilisation is necessary to secure victory right now, this autumn,” he told NV. Overall, he believes that the Russian leadership is preparing “for a possible additional and fairly large-scale mobilisation, but one that is highly unlikely after the elections — highly unlikely right now, or even this autumn”. However, according to Lukashevsky, declaring mobilisation would also bring certain advantages for the regime. “Nationwide mobilisation would provide an answer to the obvious question of why Ukrainian drones are attacking Russian cities. A mobilised society is easier to control. A curfew can be introduced. People can be assigned to civil defence. Workers and specialists can be transferred from one factory to another by government order rather than on the basis of wages or incentives. Citizens can be mobilised to build anti-drone defences,” Lukashevsky explained. It would also make it easier, he said, to justify fuel rationing or suppress public discontent. He even believes that many people might feel a certain sense of relief. “A harsh but clear mobilisation regime may seem better than a risky and uncertain normality.” “Putin’s problem, however, is that none of this would help Russia win the war. The course of the conflict is increasingly determined by more fundamental factors: the technological race between drones and anti-drone systems, the pace of innovation, the quality of communications networks, oil prices and the like. Mobilisation would solve none of them,” Lukashevsky said. And in his view, Putin appears likely to understand this. “However, the experience of recent years has shown that it is impossible to predict the balance in his mind between rational calculation and irrational ambitions. Especially when those irrational ambitions ultimately serve a very rational goal: preserving his power and ensuring the survival of his regime.” A new bridge is being built between Russia and North Korea, officially intended to support tourism and trade. However, according to Der Spiegel, its main purpose may be to supply the Russian army for the war against Ukraine. It is the bridge over the Tumen River between Khasan in Russia’s Far East and Tumangang in North Korea, which is already almost complete, according to satellite images. Its cost is estimated at one billion euros, while references to tourism sound strange given that the area is a sparsely populated periphery. While North Korea has already completed its part of the work, the Russian side is behind schedule, according to the German weekly. The pace of the project reflects the volume of trade activity between the two sides, according to CSIS analyst Victor Cha. Bridge between Russia and North Korea The bridge between Russia and North Korea over the Tumen River, next to the already constructed Friendship Railway Bridge, is meant to play a key role in military cooperation between Pyongyang and Moscow. Source: Datawrapper.de “It is primarily thanks to the soldiers, weapons, ammunition and labour force that North Korea has provided for Putin’s war in Ukraine,” Cha told the BBC. The Guardian also wrote about suspicions that the bridge could be used for the covert transport of military goods, enabling parties to evade satellite surveillance. Russia’s and North Korea’s road networks are far more extensive than their railway networks, making comprehensive monitoring more difficult. Videos of the day Smoke over Ryazan. Drone attacks on the city of around 500,000 people, located some 200 km south-east of Moscow, hit a local refinery that supplies petrol to the Moscow region via pipeline, as well as a Wildberries warehouse, according to Ukrainian media. Russian authorities, however, did not report this. Following increasingly frequent attacks on large warehouses, the online retailer began looking for sites for its logistics centres in Kazakhstan. Fire Point also confirmed an attack on one of Russia’s five largest refineries, with a capacity of 17 million tonnes of oil, saying it had been struck by one of its FP-1 drones. Drone against drone. A Ukrainian drone operator set a new record by destroying a Russian ZALA Z-20 reconnaissance drone at an altitude of 6.4 km. His unit, Lazar’s Group of Ukraine’s National Guard, released close-up footage of the attack. According to Militarnyi, the Russian surveillance drone can remain airborne for more than six hours and has a range of 100 km. What are the losses No update on Wednesday morning. By Monday morning, Russia had verifiably lost 23,916 pieces of heavy equipment (23,888 on Friday). Of these, Ukrainians destroyed 18,902 (18,866), 991 (993) were damaged, crews abandoned 1,193 (1,199), and the Ukrainian army captured 2,830 (2,830). This included 4,430 (4,430) tanks, of which 3,336 (3,332) were destroyed in combat. Ukraine lost 11,826 (11,781) pieces of equipment, of which 9,251 (9,205) were destroyed, 695 (694) damaged, 687 (689) abandoned and 1,193 (1,193) captured. This included 1,447 (1,450) tanks, of which 1,108 (1,111) were destroyed in combat. Note: Neither side regularly reports its own dead or destroyed equipment. Ukraine publishes daily figures on Russian casualties and destroyed equipment, which cannot be independently verified. This overview uses data from the Oryx project, which has compiled a list of equipment losses documented exclusively by photographs since the start of the war.