Listen: When does a hybrid attack become an attack on NATO?

Production: By Europod, in co-production with Sphera Network. EUobserver is proud to have an editorial partnership with Europod to co-publish the podcast series “Briefed” hosted by Léa Marchal. The podcast is available on all major platforms. Find the full transcript below: Two ships have been hit by drones in Bulgarian waters in the Black Sea on Monday. Several other ships have been targeted in recent weeks, at a time when Russia is intensifying its attacks on Ukraine. So, at what point does a hybrid attack become an attack on NATO? On Monday, two ships were hit by drones in the Bulgarian economic zone in the Black Sea. One of them sank, with 11 crew members missing. The second vessel, which belonged to Ukraine, was damaged but did not sink, and all 15 people on board were rescued. A week earlier, two other cargo ships had been attacked by drones in the same area, killing 10 people. And on 5 October, a Turkish cargo ship carrying grain was sunk by drones shortly after leaving Ukraine. There is currently no evidence proving that Russia was behind these attacks, and Moscow has not claimed responsibility. But that did not stop Bulgarian Prime Minister Roumen Radev from summoning Russia's ambassador. Radev said that, while there was no conclusive evidence, the outcome of these attacks clearly benefited Russia more than anyone else. Russia's ambassador to Bulgaria, Eleonora Mitrofanova, said she had received no information from the Russian defence ministry about the attacks. She also suggested that they could have been provocations carried out by a third party. And that uncertainty is important, because it makes it much harder for NATO countries to decide when an incident should be treated as an attack. So how do Europeans cope with these attacks? We've already seen several Russian drones end up inside EU territory in recent months. And in some cases, they have been clearly identified. Take the Russian drone that crashed on a residential building in the Romanian city of Galați in May and injured two people. Or the two drones found at Leipzig airport in Germany this summer, charged with explosives. They were all identified as Russian. So far, however, the response has consisted mainly of diplomatic measures and political statements. Neither Bulgaria nor Germany has requested formal consultations under Article 4 of the NATO treaty. Article 4 allows a NATO member to ask for consultations when it believes its territorial integrity, political independence or security is threatened. Bulgarian Prime Minister Radev has spoken with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte about the incidents, which are serious enough to be discussed at NATO level. But Bulgaria has not gone as far as triggering Article 4. One reason is precisely the ambiguity surrounding all these drone attacks: who is controlling them, whether they were deliberately sent into EU territory, and whether they were jammed or diverted. But if an attack were clearly attributed to Russia, how would NATO respond? That's one of the questions currently being discussed within the alliance. On Monday, NATO's top military commander, US General Alexus Grynkewich, said he did not believe a conflict between Russia and NATO was imminent or inevitable. But he also presented what NATO calls a “theory of victory”: a plan designed to ensure that the alliance could rapidly neutralise an enemy attacking one of its members. The strategy rests on several pillars. One is establishing clear red lines that an adversary should not cross. Another is investing in new military technologies, with drones playing a central role. And the third is maintaining the ability and readiness to fight at short notice. The idea is not only to be able to respond if a direct attack happens, but also to deter Russia from continuing what NATO describes as hybrid activities against its members.