How Israel kept Biden backing a Gaza war his administration wanted to end - report

Biden administration officials have expressed regret that the former US president's support for Israel ultimately "enabled" Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to broaden the war in the region, according to a long-form New Yorker investigation published last week.Several former officials told the New Yorker they now view the confrontation with Iran as a direct extension of the Gaza war.In a detailed long-form report for the magazine, several former administration officials said that former president Joe Biden reportedly believed that any pressure that the US put on Israel during the war in Gaza would lead to bigger attacks from Iran. This would mean that the US would have to step in to defend Israel, even if it caused a larger regional war.Biden’s former White House coordinator for the Middle East, Brett McGurk, argued that immovable support for Israel would help contain Iran, and warned against any “daylight” between the allies.Former Kamala Harris national security adviser Philip Gordon told the New Yorker that Washington created a "moral hazard" through its unconditional backing of Israel, allowing Netanyahu to steadily expand the conflict into other parts of the region.According to the New Yorker, doubts began to emerge about Israel's strategy in Gaza almost as soon as the war started.Israeli forces are seen operating in the Gaza Strip on January 29, 2024 (credit: IDF SPOKESPERSON'S UNIT)US officials were alarmed by Israel's Gaza strategy at start of warInside the administration, officials were stunned by the scale of Israel's opening air campaign. While the IDF maintained it was operating in accordance with international law, several officials questioned whether the intensity of the strikes could be reconciled with efforts to minimize civilian casualties.The New York Times previously reported that Israel revised its rules of engagement after October 7, allowing mid-level officers to approve strikes risking up to 20 civilian deaths to eliminate a rank-and-file Hamas operative.Notably, the IDF has never previously fully outlined what its redlines are in situations like these.The Jerusalem Post learned in 2024 that the IDF has set ratios. It also views the message of the NYT report – that these ratios are essentially part of a carte-blanche strategy – as inaccurate.The Post reported that the IDF’s view is that the NYT report confused various minimal parameters that may exist for setting at what level different-ranked IDF officials are mandated to sign off on certain strikes – with being the final call on approving a strike.Officials questioned whether entire neighborhoods were being destroyed without sufficient distinction between military and civilian targets."We were all shocked at how aggressive and deadly it was, and asking, 'What the f**k are they doing?'" one senior State Department official told the New Yorker.Palestinians collect aid supplies from a truck that entered Gaza, amid a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, in Khan Younis, in the southern Gaza Strip October 12, 2025. (credit: Ramadan Abed/Reuters)Humanitarian aid quickly became another major source of conflict between Washington and Jerusalem.After Hamas's October 7 attack, Israel sealed Gaza's crossings, with then-defense minister Yoav Gallant declaring a "complete siege.""No electricity, no food, no water, no fuel, everything will be closed," Gallant said. "We are fighting human animals, and we are acting accordingly."Biden officials' pleas to allow more aid into Gaza fell on deaf ears, report allegesAccording to the New Yorker, Secretary of State Antony Blinken urged Netanyahu and Gallant to allow aid into Gaza, arguing it was "a moral responsibility" as well as "a strategic imperative and a legal imperative."Netanyahu reportedly resisted until Blinken threatened to cancel Biden's planned visit to Israel. Even then, Israel agreed only to limited aid deliveries through Rafah and, according to the report, Netanyahu wanted the decision kept quiet to avoid political backlash from Israelis who wanted no aid to enter Gaza.Soon afterward, Netanyahu publicly declared Israel "will not allow humanitarian assistance" from "our territory into the Gaza Strip."Aid negotiations became a constant feature of US-Israel contacts, with Blinken and Sullivan often negotiating the number of aid trucks entering Gaza and which supplies Israeli inspectors would permit.Inspectors reportedly blocked items including fertilizer, tent poles, oxygen cylinders, X-ray machines and childbirth kits, while entire truckloads could be rejected if they contained a single prohibited item.The disagreements extended beyond humanitarian aid.While no senior Biden administration official questioned Israel's right to respond to Hamas's October 7 attack, officials increasingly believed the scope of the military campaign threatened broader US objectives in the region.According to the New Yorker, Biden, Blinken and national security adviser Jake Sullivan feared that an extended war would endanger US troops, complicate hostage negotiations and increase the risk of a regional conflict involving Iran and Hezbollah.Those concerns emerged within days of the war.IDF troops operate in the Gaza Strip. September 24, 2024. (credit: IDF SPOKESPERSON'S UNIT)Netanyahu reportedly ignored US requests to limit Israel-Hamas War to Gaza StripWhen Netanyahu ordered preparatory airstrikes against Hezbollah in Lebanon, Biden intervened directly, warning that the United States was not yet prepared for the consequences of a wider regional war. Netanyahu ultimately called off the operation.During Biden's visit to Israel days later, he publicly cautioned against allowing anger to dictate military decisions."While you feel that rage, don't be consumed by it," he said. "The vast majority of Palestinians are not Hamas."Behind the scenes, however, the administration urged Israel to narrow its military campaign.American officials argued that a large-scale ground invasion of Gaza would complicate efforts to free the hostages and make Hamas more difficult to defeat. Instead, they advocated intelligence-driven operations modeled on US campaigns against ISIS and al-Qaeda, and even dispatched senior military officers to share battlefield experience with the IDF.Israeli leaders remained unconvinced.According to New Yorker, former defense minister Benny Gantz outlined a vision in which Israeli troops would continue controlling security corridors across Gaza after the war so that "anyone looking into Gaza would see the backs of Israeli soldiers."Administration officials repeatedly pressed Netanyahu to explain what victory would look like and how Hamas could be defeated without a political alternative to replace it.Blinken also warned Israeli leaders that military operations alone could not eliminate Hamas's ideology.When Netanyahu expanded his stated objective from destroying Hamas to achieving "total victory," officials increasingly concluded the war had no clear endpoint.By late 2023, frustration within the administration was mounting.Austin warned that excessive civilian casualties would ultimately undermine Israel's security."You create more terrorists," he said.Later, as the fighting intensified, he sharpened the warning."If you drive them into the arms of the enemy," Austin said, "you replace a tactical victory with a strategic defeat."Reportedly, everyone on the Biden team, including Austin, believed that Israel was killing more Gazan civilians than was necessary to achieve its goal of dismantling Hamas in Gaza.One senior White House official told the New Yorker that the IDF “just operate totally differently than we [the US] operate as a ground force.”Privately, officials also questioned whether they had any real leverage over Netanyahu."We tried, but we had no chance of success, in retrospect, because Netanyahu wasn't talking to us; he was talking to his own public," senior presidential adviser Amos Hochstein told the New Yorker.The administration also came to believe it had misjudged Israel's timetable.Blinken: "I don't want to hear that phrase 'two more weeks' ever again!" For months, Netanyahu and former strategic affairs minister Ron Dermer assured Washington that major combat operations were almost complete."Just two more weeks," they repeatedly told US officials.Those assurances shaped Biden's calculations."If it is just a few more weeks, why have a huge fight with Israel?" one official recalled.Another added: "We thought that this could, would, and should be over in December."Instead, the campaign steadily expanded.After operations in northern Gaza, Blinken warned Israeli officials: "Don't do in the south what you did in the north!"Israel nevertheless launched major operations in Khan Yunis before preparing to move into Rafah.When Sullivan warned Israeli officials that Rafah would be next, they insisted otherwise."No, no, no, we are not going to go after Rafah!"Within weeks, Netanyahu announced plans for an operation there.Several former officials said they eventually concluded the repeated promises of "two more weeks" were designed to delay a confrontation with Washington until facts on the ground had changed.By early 2024, Blinken had lost patience."I don't want to hear that phrase 'two more weeks' ever again!" he told Dermer."OK," Dermer replied, "I will say 'fortnight.'"Blinken later acknowledged he never fully determined whether Israeli officials had genuinely believed their own timelines."Were they being genuine, or were they being disingenuous?" he told the New Yorker. "I think it's a combination. I would take them at their word, certainly into very early ’24—less so as time went on, and that was a huge frustration.” As civilian casualties mounted, the administration turned to a question it had largely avoided during the war's opening months: whether US military aid should be used as leverage.Biden's failed effort to change Netanyahu's course in Gaza WarOfficials debated withholding some offensive weapons, particularly the 2,000-pound bombs used in densely populated areas, while others urged Biden to publicly challenge Netanyahu directly.One proposal called for Biden to deliver a televised address to the Israeli public arguing that an unlimited war would isolate Israel internationally, jeopardize hostage negotiations and undermine prospects for regional normalization.The speech was never delivered.Privately, Biden administration officials would push Netanyahu on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.“No one’s going anywhere, no matter what some people on both sides want. So how does this end?” The former secretary of state reportedly told the prime minister.But publicly, the White House adopted what one official described as a "no daylight" strategy, continuing to pressure Israel privately while avoiding an open breach with Netanyahu.That approach began to unravel as the war dragged on and Israeli operations expanded despite repeated US objections.By early 2024, the administration had begun openly debating whether continued military aid could be used to influence Israeli policy.As civilian casualties mounted and humanitarian conditions deteriorated, officials considered withholding offensive weapons, particularly the 2,000-pound bombs used in densely populated areas. Others argued Biden should publicly confront Netanyahu after months of relying almost exclusively on private diplomacy.The debate intensified after Sen. Chris Van Hollen pushed legislation requiring the administration to certify that recipients of US weapons were complying with international humanitarian law. Rather than oppose the measure, the White House incorporated much of its language into National Security Memorandum 20, which requires the State Department to assess whether countries receiving American weapons comply with the laws of war.When did Biden's approach to Israel change?At the same time, Biden's public tone toward Israel began to shift.He described Israel's military campaign as "over the top," saying innocent civilians were "starving" and "dying." Privately, he warned Netanyahu not to launch an operation in Rafah without an "executable plan" to protect the more than one million Palestinians sheltering there.The turning point came after an Israeli strike on April 1, 2024, killed seven World Central Kitchen aid workers, including a dual US-Canadian citizen.For the first time, Biden publicly warned that future US support would depend on Israel taking "specific, concrete, and measurable steps" to reduce civilian suffering.Blinken also sent former defense minister Yoav Gallant a previously undisclosed letter warning that continued military assistance would depend on Israel's compliance with US laws governing humanitarian aid and civilian protection.When the State Department completed its legal review weeks later, it exposed deep divisions within the administration.According to the New Yorker, several bureaus concluded Israel had likely used American weapons in ways inconsistent with the laws of war or had obstructed humanitarian aid. Others argued the available evidence did not justify suspending military assistance.The disagreement became public after reports emerged that the administration had paused deliveries of thousands of 2,000-pound bombs.Biden acknowledged the decision in an interview with CNN."Civilians have been killed in Gaza as a consequence of those bombs," he said. "If they go into Rafah, I'm not supplying the weapons."Despite the warning, the New Yorker reports that Biden approved the transfer of accompanying shipments of 500-pound bombs after rejecting proposals for a broader suspension of military aid.Israeli soldiers stand on rubble in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip, December 8, 2025. (credit: REUTERS/NIR ELIAS)Did Biden officials believe Israel committed war crimes in GazaOfficials also struggled with a legal question that remained unresolved throughout the war.Government lawyers concluded they lacked sufficient evidence to determine whether specific Israeli strikes constituted war crimes, despite widespread concern over civilian casualties.One lawyer summarized the administration's dilemma."We don't have definitive proof, but we are very concerned that Israel is committing war crimes."The State Department ultimately concluded it was "reasonable to assess" that Israel had used US weapons in ways "inconsistent" with international humanitarian law, but said the evidence was insufficient to suspend military assistance.Some officials believed the administration had missed its best opportunity to influence Israeli policy.Former Harris advisor Gordon argued National Security Memorandum 20 "could have been, and should have been, the tool that we used to get the Israelis to do things differently."Instead, he said, after the report's release, "they knew that we wouldn't."Officials involved in ceasefire negotiations also concluded that Netanyahu was prolonging the war for domestic political reasons.According to the New Yorker, Biden abandoned plans to deliver a tougher public address after Israeli officials indicated they were prepared to pursue a phased ceasefire and hostage agreement. But several former officials said Netanyahu later added new conditions after Hamas signaled it was prepared to move forward."Bibi was playing games," one former White House official told the magazine.Blinken and Austin later warned Israel that continued restrictions on humanitarian aid could trigger another review of US military assistance. Israel briefly increased aid deliveries, but after Donald Trump's election victory in November 2024, the administration's remaining leverage largely disappeared.Looking back, former officials offered sharply different assessments of their own record.Some believed sustained US pressure prevented an even greater humanitarian disaster by increasing aid deliveries and encouraging civilian evacuations.Others concluded the administration's reluctance to confront Netanyahu publicly prolonged the conflict without substantially changing Israeli policy.Blinken acknowledged the human cost of the war."How can you not have regrets given the toll that this took on innocent men, women and children?" he told the New Yorker.He nevertheless defended the administration's intentions, repeating a phrase he often attributed to Biden: "Question my judgments. Don't question my motives."Sullivan said officials repeatedly weighed whether to break more decisively with Israel, but each option carried significant risks."We'd get progress and backsliding, progress and backsliding, over and over again," he said."What about the hostages? What about Israel under attack from all sides? What effect would it have on the ceasefire talks and bringing this god-awful war to an end?"By the administration's final months, officials prepared one last internal memorandum questioning the military necessity of Israel's continued operations and warning of "grave concerns" over the starvation and displacement of civilians.But by that point, it was too late. Trump was already on the way to the White House.