US-Vietnam strategic partnership faces intellectual property test

A widening dispute over intellectual property protection may soon test whether the US-Vietnam Comprehensive Strategic Partnership is more than a mere diplomatic label. The Office of the US Trade Representative opened a Section 301 investigation into Vietnam in May after designating the country a Priority Foreign Country in its 2026 Special 301 Report, the most serious category in Washington’s annual assessment of foreign intellectual-property regimes. USTR says Vietnam has failed to resolve longstanding problems involving intellectual property protection and enforcement, harming American innovators, creators and businesses. The investigation will determine whether Vietnamese policies or practices are unreasonable or discriminatory and burden US commerce. But the stakes extend well beyond patents, trademarks and pirated products. The dispute comes as Washington and Hanoi are trying to build a much more ambitious economic and strategic relationship around semiconductors, artificial intelligence, advanced manufacturing, resilient supply chains and digital technology. Weak intellectual property enforcement sits uneasily alongside those ambitions. That makes the Section 301 investigation a test of whether the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership can turn economic friction into institutional cooperation. The transformation in US-Vietnam relations has been remarkable. The two former enemies normalized diplomatic relations in 1995 and elevated ties to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2023. Bilateral trade, worth only US$451 million in 1995, but bilateral goods trade reached about $209.5 billion in 2025, underscoring how much economic weight now sits behind the US-Vietnam strategic partnership. The partnership now encompasses trade and investment, science and technology, semiconductors, security, energy, education and digital development. Yet strategic partnerships ultimately are measured not only by the agreements governments sign when relations are good, but by their capacity to manage disagreements when interests diverge. Intellectual property presents just such a challenge. Washington’s complaints are not new. USTR says it proposed intellectual-property work plans to Vietnam in 2020 and again in 2023, but judged progress insufficient. That history argues for a stronger approach: elevating IP into the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with clear benchmarks, regular reviews and measurable enforcement goals. For Washington, stronger IP enforcement is central to protecting companies whose competitiveness depends increasingly on patents, software, trademarks, copyrights, trade secrets and proprietary technology. But in Hanoi, stronger intellectual property protection should not be viewed simply as another American trade demand. It increasingly serves Vietnam’s own interests. Vietnam wants to move beyond its established role as a manufacturing and export platform and become a higher-income, innovation-driven economy. Its ambitions increasingly encompass semiconductors, artificial intelligence, digital services, advanced manufacturing and domestic research and development. Those ambitions require more than factories, engineers and foreign capital. They require institutions capable of protecting ideas. Companies are reluctant to transfer sophisticated technology, locate research operations or develop valuable intellectual property in markets where proprietary knowledge may be difficult to protect. Vietnamese entrepreneurs, scientists and technology companies have the same interest in predictable enforcement as their foreign counterparts. Intellectual-property protection, therefore, is not merely a concession extracted by Washington. It is part of the legal infrastructure Vietnam will need for its own economic transition. There are indications that Hanoi recognizes the problem. Vietnam has stepped up enforcement against counterfeit goods, smuggling and intellectual property violations. During the first half of 2026, authorities handled nearly 20,000 violations, while more than 9,000 infringing products were removed from major e-commerce platforms. Those figures do not prove that Vietnam has resolved Washington’s concerns. But they do suggest the debate is shifting from legislation toward implementation. That is where Washington should focus. Section 301 gives the United States significant leverage, including the possibility of trade measures if USTR concludes Vietnamese practices burden US commerce. But pressure alone is unlikely to solve weaknesses rooted in enforcement capacity, institutional coordination and rapidly changing digital markets. The more durable solution would combine pressure for measurable results with a more ambitious framework for cooperation. Washington and Hanoi should make intellectual property a formal pillar of their Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, building on previous work-plan discussions but giving it greater political weight. Such a mechanism could include cooperation between customs and enforcement authorities, joint efforts against counterfeit goods sold through online platforms, training for investigators and judges, stronger protection of trade secrets and regular engagement with companies confronting infringement. Just as important, progress should be measurable. The objective should be to create a standing mechanism capable of identifying problems and resolving them before they repeatedly escalate into major trade disputes. The timing is favorable. Vietnamese officials have recently discussed expanding cooperation with Washington in high technology, artificial intelligence, semiconductors, innovation and resilient supply chains. Intellectual property belongs squarely within that agenda. A country seeking to become a trusted destination for semiconductor investment, AI development and advanced technology cannot separate those ambitions from the protection of the software, designs, processes and proprietary knowledge underpinning those industries. For Washington, the strategic objective should not simply be forcing Vietnam to satisfy another American compliance demand. It should be helping create an institutional environment in which American and Vietnamese innovation can flourish while raising the cost of infringement. For Hanoi, credible progress would strengthen Vietnam’s position as companies diversify supply chains and look for sophisticated manufacturing and technology partners across Asia. Predictable IP protection could make Vietnam more attractive not only as a production base but also as a destination for research, technology partnerships and higher-value investment. That would advance Vietnam’s economic objectives while reinforcing US efforts to develop resilient economic relationships across the Indo-Pacific. None of this requires Washington to abandon pressure. Vietnam’s designation as a Priority Foreign Country is serious, and Hanoi will have to demonstrate results rather than simply announce new regulations or enforcement campaigns. But strategic partnerships require something beyond leverage. They require mechanisms for managing disputes before disputes begin to define the relationship. The US and Vietnam will continue to disagree over trade. Their economies are too deeply connected for friction to disappear, and the large bilateral trade imbalance ensures commercial tensions will remain part of the political relationship. The more important question is whether those disagreements become recurring crises or catalysts for stronger institutions. Intellectual property offers an opportunity to find out. If Washington and Hanoi treat the issue primarily as another contest over trade penalties and concessions, it could become a persistent source of friction. If they use the investigation to establish measurable enforcement standards, sustained technical cooperation and a permanent channel for resolving disputes, they could turn a commercial confrontation into something more valuable. Thirty years after normalization and three years after declaring a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, the relationship is entering a more demanding phase. Protecting patents and copyrights is part of that challenge. But the larger test is whether Washington and Hanoi can translate strategic ambition into durable economic institutions. James Borton is a non-resident senior fellow at Johns Hopkins SAIS Foreign Policy Institute and the author of Harvesting the Waves: How Blue Parks Shape Policy, Politics, and Peacebuilding in the South China Sea.