‘Unrestricted Permission to Kill’: Inside Kherson’s Drone War

Deep inside Kherson’s red zone, a staircase leads below ground. Here, as in many parts of the city, spaces beneath the surface provide protection for people and essential infrastructure. Inside the bunker, the way leads through long corridors under fluorescent light, turning left, then right, then around another corner. Each passage gives way to another, stretching the walk into what feels like an endless underground maze.JOIN US ON TELEGRAMFollow our coverage of the war on the @Kyivpost_official. Above ground, Kherson remains terrorized by Russian drones as the war grinds into autumn. In a city often dubbed a “human safari,” civilians have been pursued while walking, cycling and driving through the city. Human Rights Watch has documented attacks in which drone footage showed that operators could see the civilian nature of their targets and struck anyway. September brought further attacks on the ordinary movements of civilian life. On Sept. 4, a Russian drone struck a bus in the city’s Tsentralnyi district, killing a 47-year-old man; a 76-year-old woman died of her injuries the following day. On Sept. 13, a drone hit an ambulance carrying a patient in Korabelnyi district, injuring its driver and a paramedic and leaving the vehicle burned out. Three days later, explosives dropped from a drone killed a 68-year-old man in the open, according to local authorities and prosecutors. In the room at the end of the underground passage sit Oleh and Mykola, known by their respective call signs “Hades” and “Cousin.” The two National Guard soldiers serve in a mobile fire group whose task is to intercept and destroy Russian drones. Other Topics of Interest EU Unveils €710M Aid Package for Displaced People in Ukraine, Middle East, Africa Ursula Von der Leyen said the package includes €52 million ($59 million) to help Ukraine prepare for winter and €103 million ($117 million) for Palestine and Lebanon. Hades, the chief sergeant of an artillery company, has served since 2014, including in Ukraine’s Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO) – Kyiv’s official designation for Russia’s initial 2014 invasion using proxy militants. He transferred to the air-defense unit about two years ago. Cousin, a junior sergeant commanding a machine-gun squad, joined the regiment’s anti-aircraft missile and artillery battery in May 2024, around the time it was established. Kyiv Post met the two members of the National Guard’s 34th Kherson Regiment to discuss the changing drone threat, the difficulties of defending the city and the personal demands of confronting weapons that can kill within seconds. Kyiv Post: What kinds of aerial threats do you encounter most frequently? Cousin: The principal threats in Kherson and the surrounding region are [first-person view] FPV drones, along with the large number of Molniya drones now being deployed. The Molniya is a Russian design that uses an anti-tank mine as its explosive payload. Its destructive effect is considerable. It is among the Russian weapons causing the greatest destruction in this region. How does the intensity of drone attacks fluctuate? Hades: The intensity rises and falls rather than following a consistent trajectory. One week there may be fewer incursions; the following week can be a nightmare, when ordinary civilians cannot even venture outside. The situation keeps changing. I cannot give you a definitive assessment that the overall threat is either increasing or diminishing. Have you noticed changes in the way Russian forces deploy their drones? Hades: The changes are unmistakable if you compare the situation with two years ago. Drone technology has developed considerably. New variants have emerged, including fiber-optic FPVs, and the enemy’s pilots are accumulating experience. They continually refine their equipment and improve its performance. Their capabilities are developing rapidly, and they are constantly adapting their tactics. What is the hardest part of your work, personally? Cousin: One of the greatest difficulties is anticipating the enemy’s approach. There is no fixed method, no single playbook that they consistently follow. Their tactics vary from day to day. They approach at different speeds and use different types of drones. Sometimes they deploy a swarm; sometimes they bring drones in succession, in a kind of carousel. Once they identify a target, they make every effort to destroy it. They do not hold back on the drones they expend. They also use reconnaissance drones to direct artillery fire. Once a target has been located, they try to eliminate it completely. Hades: I would add that the hardest part is overcoming your own fear before going out on a mission. You have to understand that a drone is approaching and that your responsibility is to destroy it. Simply opening fire is not enough. You have to bring it down so that it cannot continue toward another target. To put it bluntly, not everyone has the balls to run out and confront a drone that could kill them in two seconds. Not everyone is capable of doing that. Overcoming that instinctive fear is a very significant part of the job. Looking back over the past year, what has changed most in the drone threat around Kherson? Cousin: The number of drones has increased. The enemy also has drones equipped with machine vision. Once a drone with that capability has acquired its target, electronic jamming or even severing the fiber-optic cable does not necessarily prevent it from continuing the attack. It will still attempt to strike the target it has locked onto. Those are the kinds of challenges we are confronting now. Editor’s note: Machine vision uses software to interpret camera images. When combined with onboard automatic flight control, it can allow a drone to continue toward an already acquired target after losing contact with its pilot: The camera and onboard computer keep tracking the target and guiding the aircraft. This capability is distinct from the fiber-optic connection itself and is not present on every FPV drone. Anti-drone nets cover a street beside a bus stop reinforced with protective barriers in Kherson on July 22, 2026. A military recruitment billboard stands in front of the apartment building behind it. (Photo by Korbinian Leo Kramer) Behind the drone attacks The mobile fire group confronts the threat once it reaches the skies over Kherson. For the regiment’s intelligence chief, whose call sign “The Great” refers to Kyiv’s Prince Volodymyr the Great from the 10th-11th century, reducing that threat also requires action against Russian crews, training centers and supply routes. Kyiv Post met him at the same underground location. How would you describe the current security situation in your area of responsibility? The Great: The security situation remains difficult, particularly because the enemy’s conduct forces us to devote considerable effort to protecting civilians and evacuating them from the red zone – the areas under fire. They do not allow us to establish safe evacuation corridors, whether to bring civilians out, evacuate the wounded, including those with serious injuries, or even recover the dead. In our area of responsibility, military casualties are considerably lower than civilian casualties. That tells you something about the adversary we are facing. They have also shifted toward a greater reliance on FPV drones because their artillery is being successfully knocked out. The artillery systems they are using have a shorter reach than the FPVs, and deploying those systems exposes them to greater risk than operating drones. A drone is an exceptionally dangerous weapon because of the precision with which it can strike. How does the situation around Kherson today compare with a year ago? The Great: It has deteriorated. The enemy’s ability to monitor the city and strike critical and civilian infrastructure has increased. They have brought in the 50th Unmanned Systems Brigade specifically for this sector. In effect, its personnel train here as drone operators before being sent to more demanding sectors of the front. I want to emphasize that this is a presidential brigade, directly subordinate to the supreme commander of the Russian Armed Forces, Vladimir Putin. In my view, the way they conduct this war reflects the decisions and instructions of the Russian president. Their commanders give them what amounts to unrestricted permission to kill: Whatever you see, you strike. Do you see a clear strategy behind the Russian attacks on Kherson? The Great: There is no strategy that would fundamentally change the military situation here. If there is a strategy, it is to intimidate the civilian population and reduce the number of people remaining in Kherson, which would make it easier for them to strike military personnel and military facilities. But that does not give them the means to alter the strategic situation. At present, they lack the capability to force a crossing of the river or carry out an operation on that scale. Are Russian forces primarily trying to destroy infrastructure, disrupt logistics or terrorize civilians? The Great: These are interconnected measures. They form part of the same effort to terrorize the population. Striking critical infrastructure and civilian infrastructure is part of that. They also attack medical facilities and deliberately strike people they can clearly identify as civilians. Do you expect the drone threat to continue increasing? Civilians here repeatedly say that there were fewer drones a year or two ago. What could reverse that trend? The Great: I think the situation will continue to deteriorate unless specific measures are taken against the enemy’s drone crews and their logistics. We have to prevent them from bringing in drones, personnel, ammunition and the fuel needed to transport those supplies. Our military and political leadership needs to concentrate on addressing the source of the problem: The crews themselves and the centers where they are trained and prepared for operations. That is how we can change the situation and ease the pressure on Kherson and other cities exposed to enemy drones. The same principle applies across different types of unmanned aircraft, from short-range FPVs and drones dropping munitions to Shaheds and other long-range systems. Would you say that artillery, tank and mortar fire are being used to destroy Kherson, while drones are being used to terrorize its civilian population? The Great: Yes. Absolutely. To terrorize our civilians. So the main objective here is not to capture more territory? The Great: I think the objective here is less about territorial conquest than about applying pressure to force negotiations. The purpose is to foster public discontent and force our government to the negotiating table on terms dictated by the Russian Federation. Russia no longer has the capacity to seize territory as it did in previous years. Its offensive capabilities have fallen almost to zero. We can all see how it is struggling to advance in difficult sectors of the front, including in the Donetsk region. They now set themselves the objective of taking all the territory of the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics by the end of 2026. Previously, the deadline was the end of 2025; before that, it was the end of 2024. Year after year, they also say they will capture Kherson. But they do not have the capability to do so. Looking ahead to the coming months, what concerns you most, and what gives you confidence? The Great: My greatest concern is an increase in civilian casualties, alongside the risk that attacks could cut off supplies to our units and prevent food and humanitarian assistance from reaching civilians. What gives me confidence is that we know how to counter the enemy and are continually learning and refining the way we operate. We work closely with the other units in our sector, and that cooperation produces tangible results, including periods of reduced enemy activity. Ukraine has increased pressure on Russian military infrastructure and supply routes connected to Crimea. Have those operations had an effect in the Kherson sector, and have Russian tactics changed as a result? The Great: Yes, the situation has changed. Disruption to the routes supplying provisions, fuel and lubricants has had a substantial effect on the enemy’s tactics. Previously, they could travel by vehicle to within 5 to 6 kilometers [3 to 3.7 miles] of the line of contact, dismount and cover the remaining distance to their forward positions on foot. Now, because of shortages of fuel and lubricants, they may have to walk 24 to 30 kilometers [15 to 18.6 miles] simply to reach their positions. I am not exaggerating those distances. Food supplies have also been affected. Enemy food depots in Crimea have been destroyed. We know that their units are experiencing difficulties obtaining provisions and that personnel are not getting enough to eat. That undermines morale and reduces their physical capacity to move, make short dashes and take up positions. They are adapting by minimizing vehicle use and trying to reduce personnel losses through concealed movement. I cannot discuss how they intend to conceal those movements. We are aware of what they are considering, but, in our assessment, their thinking and their actions are flawed. A pedestrian carrying an umbrella walks past an apartment building behind anti-drone netting in Kherson on July 22, 2026. (Photo by Korbinian Leo Kramer) What would you say to people still living in Kherson’s red zone? Can you offer reassurance that things will improve soon, or would you urge them to leave? The Great: Please leave the red zone. We cannot save everyone, and it is very difficult to promise that everything will be all right. I do not know whether I will survive today – whether I will make it home or back to our headquarters.