TURNING POINT: South Africa’s unfinished Lula Moment — lessons from Brazil

President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s remarkable election victory in Brazil on 25 October has revived interest in an idea first raised by the South African labour movement more than a decade ago: the need for a “Lula Moment” in South Africa.The phrase “Lula Moment” was first coined in Cosatu debates in 2011 and 2012. It was never intended as an exercise in political hero worship, nor was it based on the simplistic notion that South Africa could copy Brazil’s experience. Rather, it described a strategic turning point: a moment when a society confronted by economic stagnation, inequality, political paralysis and growing popular discontent is faced with a choice. Does it continue along a failing trajectory, or does it use the crisis to pursue a bold developmental shift?Looking back in 2026, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that South Africa was faced with precisely such a moment nearly 20 years ago, and failed to seize it.The concept of a Lula Moment is worth revisiting not simply as a historical reflection, but because many of the conditions that gave rise to it remain stubbornly entrenched. South Africa continues to grapple with mass unemployment, extreme inequality, deindustrialisation, weak growth, growing insecurity and declining confidence in political institutions. Meanwhile Brazil, after years of turbulence, has once again become a central battleground in the global struggle between progressive and far-right forces.Similarly, the dramatic events surrounding Lula’s 2026 election victory do not simply tell us something about Brazil. They tell us something about the current global moment and about challenges facing progressive forces everywhere, including in South Africa.The question is what lessons we are able to draw from that experience, both then and now.Luiz Inácio Lula Da Silva waves a Brazilian flag during a rally in São Paulo on 24 October ahead of the presidential runoff. (Photo: Alexandre Schneider/Getty Images) A crossroads in South African politicsThe origins of the Lula Moment lie in a highly volatile period in South African political history.The ANC’s 2007 Polokwane conference represented the most significant internal rupture in the liberation movement since 1994. The ousting of Thabo Mbeki by Jacob Zuma was not simply a leadership contest. It happened in the context of a broader battle over the direction of the movement and the democratic project itself.Thabo Mbeki at the ANC National Conference at the University of Limpopo in Polokwane on 17 December 2007. (Photo: Jon Hrusa / EPA)The replacement of the Reconstruction and Development Programme by Gear in 1996 ushered in a decade during which economic policy became increasingly dominated by fiscal conservatism, inflation targeting, trade liberalisation and market-centred reforms. Many within the Tripartite Alliance regarded this as a strategic departure from the transformative objectives that had animated the democratic breakthrough.The frustrations generated by this trajectory steadily accumulated.Polokwane became the vehicle through which these grievances found expression, and policy alternatives advanced. The conference adopted a series of resolutions pointing towards a more interventionist state, stronger industrial policy, and a break with aspects of the prevailing economic orthodoxy. Cosatu played a leading role in advancing these positions and many believed that a significant strategic opening had emerged.In retrospect, that optimism rested on two major errors.The first was a failure to reckon with history.There was a long history of progressive resolutions adopted by ANC structures being ignored, diluted or blocked once they reached the level of government. Powerful institutional centres, particularly within elements of the economic bureaucracy, continued to exercise enormous influence over policy regardless of mandates emerging from conferences and alliance processes.The second was a profound misreading of Zuma himself.Some in the labour movement and broader Alliance accepted Zuma’s presentation of himself as a friend of workers and critic of elitism. In hindsight, it became clear that this was a major political error. Zuma had little interest in advancing a developmental transformation project. His priorities lay elsewhere.Jacob Zuma at the ANC’s 2007 congress in Polokwane. (Photo: Johnny Onverwacht)By 2010, it was becoming increasingly evident to Cosatu leaders that neither of the key objectives sought by progressive forces at Polokwane was being realised.Not only was the anticipated policy shift failing to materialise, but a dangerous new form of politics was beginning to consolidate itself.State Capture and neoliberalism: the dual crisisKey debates over the last 10 years concerned the nature of South Africa’s crisis.Some focused primarily on corruption. Others focused primarily on economic policy. Increasingly, it became apparent that these could not be understood separately.South Africa was confronting two interconnected problems.The first was the continued implementation of an economic framework that had failed to address structural unemployment, poverty, inequality and deindustrialisation.The second was the emergence of increasingly predatory forms of accumulation centred on access to state institutions.In September 2010, then Cosatu General Secretary Zwelinzima Vavi and I drafted a discussion paper for the Cosatu Central Executive Committee entitled The Alliance at a Crossroads: The Battle Against a Predatory Elite and Political Paralysis.Former Cosatu General Secretary Zwelinzima Vavi. (Photo: Ashraf Hendricks)The paper warned that in addition to the challenges created by inappropriate economic policies, there was a rising danger that corrupt networks were becoming institutionalised within the state and society.It argued that unless these were confronted, there was the serious risk of systemic State Capture that would entail, “The systemic creation of a network of patronage and corruption ... over time no one will be able to do business with the state without going through corrupt gatekeepers.”Cosatu therefore called for the convening of a civil society conference to confront the twin challenges of neoliberalism and State Capture in South Africa.These arguments generated a furious political response.The ANC leadership accused Cosatu of pursuing a “regime change” agenda. A sustained campaign followed against critics within the labour movement and the Alliance. The eventual expulsion of South Africa’s largest union Numsa, the removal of Vavi as general secretary, and the fragmentation of Cosatu itself can all be traced, in significant part, to these battles.Yet what is often forgotten is that the warning was never simply about corruption.The labour movement was also arguing that South Africa remained trapped within an economic paradigm incapable of delivering meaningful transformation.The danger lay in the toxic combination of the two.A failing economic model serving a powerful economic elite generated a deepening social and economic crisis. State Capture simultaneously preyed on state enterprises needed to drive development, and hollowed out the state and political institutions required to pursue an alternative.South Africa was becoming trapped between neoliberalism and predatory politics.As I argued in a two-part Daily Maverick op-ed, at a time when the issue of State Capture was dominating national debate, both challenges needed to be addressed simultaneously:“An emerging predatory elite abusing its proximity to state power threatens to turn our democracy into a full blown kleptocratic state. It leeches or undermines public funds and services to ordinary people at the altar of a selfish accumulation agenda. To promote its agenda, it threatens to corrupt and capture all key organs of state. Surely this threat must be opposed with all the power at our disposal.At the same time, established big capital, which has grown on the back of a vicious accumulation path under apartheid and colonialism, continues in the most parasitic way, to extract South Africa’s resources, exploiting the economic vulnerability of the majority. It diverts the social surplus out of the country, or into speculative economic activity which only benefits a tiny but extremely powerful elite. Big business continues to refuse to invest in the country’s development.”That diagnosis remains relevant today.The battle over economic policyThe contradictions became increasingly visible in debates surrounding the National Development Plan.When the National Planning Commission was established in 2010 there was genuine optimism that it might chart a new developmental path. Important and innovative proposals emerged in a number of areas, particularly around social development, environmental sustainability and public sector reform.The major fault line concerned the economic chapter.Cosatu argued that that while certain aspects of the NDP were positive, its core economic framework largely reproduced assumptions around macroeconomic policy, labour markets and employment that had already failed to transform the economy. The issue was not planning itself. It was whether South Africa possessed an economic strategy capable of driving industrialisation, employment creation and structural transformation.The dispute became so serious that the 2013 Alliance Summit resolved that the economic chapter should be redrafted.Despite public commitments, that decision was never implemented.The problem facing South Africa was not purely a lack of plans, visions or rhetorical commitments. It was the absence of the political will and strategic coherence necessary to translate developmental objectives and plans into practice.And that would require a united powerful and coherent movement to compel this shift in strategy.It was in this context that attention increasingly turned to developments elsewhere in the world.Looking to Latin AmericaIn 2011, Cosatu commissioned a paper examining international developments and their implications for progressive politics.An important focus of this work was Latin America.Like South Africa, many countries in the region were grappling with the consequences of neoliberal reforms, rising inequality, weakening productive sectors and the power of financial markets.Brazil attracted particular attention. The parallels were striking (despite there also being significant differences).Like South Africa, Brazil is a middle-income country marked by extreme inequality, a legacy of racial oppression and authoritarianism, a substantial industrial base, and a significant organised working class. Both countries also faced questions about how to pursue developmental objectives in an era dominated by global financial markets.Extreme inequality: the Rocinha slum in Rio de Janeiro on the hillside above beachfront apartments. There was another reason Brazil mattered.Unlike the ANC, which then enjoyed over 65% electoral support, Lula’s Workers’ Party (PT) governed with relatively limited representation in Congress and was forced to navigate complex coalitions.Yet despite these constraints, important developmental gains had been achieved.How?That question became the starting point for what later became known as the Lula Moment. The original Lula MomentWhat interested us was not so much Lula’s first term, but his second.Lula’s first administration (2002-2006) was deeply contested. Elements of economic orthodoxy remained influential and corruption scandals damaged the credibility of sections of the PT.At that point the Brazilian project faced a crossroads and could easily have unravelled.It could either retreat under pressure from conservative forces or attempt a strategic reset.Lula and his allies chose the latter path.This became known as the Lula Moment in the South African labour movement, and described a strategic shift made in Brazil in the face of crisis and political pressure.What did this entail?Leadership changes were made. Developmental institutions were strengthened. The role of the state was expanded. Minimum wages consistently increased. Industrial policy was resourced. Social programmes were expanded. Public investment accelerated.As the political economist Alfredo Saad-Filho observed at the time, heterodox economists and developmentalists were appointed to strategic economic positions, activist fiscal interventions were pursued, social programmes expanded, and major efforts were made to stimulate domestic demand through rising incomes.The outcomes were significant:Millions entered formal employment.Poverty declined sharply.Brazil exited the UN Hunger Map.Income inequality fell.Public universities expanded.The minimum wage rose substantially.Social protection programmes such as Bolsa Família were deepened.Most importantly, ordinary people experienced material improvements in their daily lives.None of this amounted to a revolutionary transformation of Brazilian society. Nor did it resolve the long-term vulnerabilities that would later confront the PT.But it did demonstrate that a different trajectory was possible.What became known as the Lula Moment was essentially an attempt to identify and understand that strategic turning point.We asked key questions.Why had the Brazilian project changed direction? What political choices made that shift possible? Could similar lessons inform debates in South Africa?Lessons of the Lula Moment for South AfricaThe 2012 Cosatu Congress Political Report identified a number of lessons from the Brazilian experience:Decisive political leadership matters. Progressive projects cannot advance if they are afraid to take on powerful vested interests.Having people in the right places matters. Brazil deliberately placed individuals committed to developmental objectives in key institutions.Governments are not automatically compelled to accept every demand presented in the name of markets or investor confidence. Brazilian policymakers showed a willingness to challenge orthodox prescriptions where necessary.Practical interventions matter more than rhetoric. Programmes such as Zero Hunger focused on visible changes in people’s lives.The state must play a central developmental role. Industrial policy, development finance and public investment were treated as essential instruments rather than outdated relics.Redistribution and growth were not regarded as opposing objectives. Rising wages, stronger social protection and growing demand formed part of a broader economic development strategy.Labour formalisation mattered. Brazil demonstrated that stronger worker protections could coexist with employment creation.Ambitious objectives require the building of capable institutions and state capacity.These ideas formed the basis of the call for a South African Lula Moment.Mangaung and the rejection of the Lula MomentIn the run-up to the ANC’s 2012 Mangaung Conference, Cosatu published a booklet titled Seize the Moment! arguing for a strategic shift in economic and political direction.The message was simple. South Africa faced a choice.It could continue down a path characterised by policy drift, economic orthodoxy and growing corruption. Or it could pursue a developmental project capable of addressing unemployment, poverty and inequality.The response from parts of the ANC leadership was dismissive.Then ANC Secretary-General Gwede Mantashe famously argued that South Africa did not need a Lula Moment and quipped that you could not “put the Lula Moment in a suitcase and bring it here from Brazil”.Gwede Mantashe. (Photo: Deaan Vivier / Gallo Images / Beeld)Yet the point was never to import a Brazilian model.The point was to learn from an experience where political leadership had responded to a crisis by moving towards a more developmental agenda rather than away from it.In hindsight, the costs of the South African movement failing to change course are painfully obvious.The years subsequent to the failed campaign for a Lula Moment saw the consolidation of State Capture, prolonged economic stagnation, deep institutional damage and growing social frustration.The struggle over wages and social protectionOne area where lessons drawn from Brazil had a direct impact was wage policy.During this period, Cosatu increasingly focused on the need to transform South Africa’s highly unequal wage structure and address working poverty.Brazil’s experience was particularly instructive because it combined a strong minimum wage, collective bargaining and an extensive social protection system.These debates informed a 2012 Cosatu proposal calling for a legislated national minimum wage, strengthened bargaining institutions and a comprehensive social protection floor. These ideas were subsequently elaborated in an International Labour Organization paper titled Towards New Collective Bargaining, Wage and Social Protection Strategies: Learning from the Brazilian Experience.The ANC adopted the national minimum wage proposal. Negotiations followed. Legislation was passed in 2018 and the first national minimum wage came into effect in 2019.At the time these proposals were fiercely contested.Business organisations warned of economic disaster. Some conservative economists predicted substantial job losses.Yet the campaign eventually succeeded, and the national minimum wage was implemented without the predicted impacts on jobs or the economy.The broader package, however, was only partially realised. Progress on comprehensive social protection remains incomplete. The struggle against wage inequality continues.Nonetheless it demonstrated that ideas once dismissed as unrealistic could become policy.Lula’s message to South AfricaWhen Lula addressed the Cosatu executive during his visit to South Africa in 2012, he made an input that has become increasingly relevant.He argued against the distinction often made between so-called consumption spending and investment spending.The implication of this distinction is that spending on working-class and poor households is somehow less productive than other forms of expenditure.Lula rejected this completely.Workers and poor households spend what they receive. That spending circulates through local economies, stimulates production and generates demand.As he put it, when money started reaching workers and poor households, the giant wheels of the Brazilian economy began turning.This insight lies behind contemporary debates on income support, social grants and basic income.Research in Brazil, and more recently in South Africa, suggests that social protection can generate powerful economic multipliers rather than simply representing a fiscal cost.The debate remains highly relevant as South Africa grapples with the future of income support.What does Brazil’s 2026 election tell us?The dramatic developments surrounding Brazil’s 2026 election provide important lessons for progressives globally.It has become clear that progressive forces face a far more hostile environment than existed 20 years ago, and conditions in Brazil, and associated challenges have changed.The rise of the far right is not unique to Brazil.Across much of the world, growing insecurity and frustration have been channelled into authoritarian and reactionary political projects.Deindustrialisation, the fragmentation of labour markets, the rise of platform work, the weakening of trade unions, the growth of social media ecosystems dominated by the tech giants and the failures of neoliberalism have all contributed to this trend.Brazil has experienced all of these dynamics. Indeed, Lula’s difficulties in the first round of the 2026 elections reflected their growing strength.The response of the Brazilian progressive movement in contesting the second round offers important lessons.Rather than retreating and moving to the political centre, the Lula campaign increasingly focused on concrete issues affecting working people.It addressed wages, debt, social protection, platform work, insecurity and declining living standards.It acknowledged popular frustrations rather than dismissing them. It mobilised millions of people. It reconnected political debate to everyday material realities. For South Africa, that lesson is critical.People are unlikely to be won over by abstract policy frameworks or technocratic fixes alone. They need to see credible pathways towards improved lives.A second Lula Moment?The irony is that Brazil itself may now be entering a second Lula Moment.Following the election victory, financial markets and sections of the international media immediately began calling for fiscal restraint and expenditure cuts.Familiar warnings have returned:Social spending must be reduced.Markets must be reassured.Developmental ambitions must be moderated.The challenge facing Lula’s government is therefore similar to the one that emerged two decades ago.Voices within Lula’s coalition have pushed back strongly.As Minister in the Presidency Guilherme Boulos argued after the election, voters elected a programme of social inclusion and development, not austerity.The question now is whether Brazil’s government will retreat in the face of pressure, or will it use the political mandate generated through popular mobilisation to advance a more ambitious developmental agenda?How that question is answered will matter well beyond Brazil.South Africa’s unfinished Lula MomentSouth Africa cannot simply replicate another country’s experience.Our history is different. Our institutions are different. Our economy is different.Yet it would be equally mistaken to conclude that there is nothing to learn from the Brazilian experience.The enduring lesson of the Lula Moment is that political trajectories are not fixed. Choices matter. Institutions matter. Leadership matters. Movements matter.The tragedy of South Africa’s missed Lula Moment was not merely that the labour movement failed to persuade the ANC leadership to change direction.It was that a genuine opportunity to confront both neoliberal stagnation and emerging State Capture was lost.The consequences continue to shape our politics today.South Africa still faces mass unemployment, extreme inequality, weak growth and declining trust in institutions.The question confronting progressive forces is remarkably similar to the one that faced Brazil two decades ago, and again in 2026.Can a programme be built that materially improves people’s lives, rebuilds state capacity, addresses inequality and restores hope?Or will the vacuum continue to be filled by some combination of market orthodoxy, patronage politics and increasingly dangerous forms of populism where the most vulnerable parts of the population become the scapegoats?Can we generate the leadership, vision, organisation and social mobilisation needed to drive the strategic shift our society so desperately needs?That in essence was the question posed by the idea of a Lula Moment in 2012. It remains the question today. DMThis is an edited and shortened version of an essay on Substack. Read the full version here.