Trump’s delinquent America is a gift to China

This weekend, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping are among the heads of state gathering in New Delhi for the 18th iteration of the BRICS summit. The forum, which began as a project between Russia, China, India and Brazil, has since expanded to include 10 full members as well as 10 partner nations. Long dismissed in the West as little more than an irritant, the BRICS has become the highest-profile gathering of non-Western leaders. Shorts At a time when the so-called “rules-based international order’ is unravelling, the BRICS is emblematic of today’s shifting global dynamics. Nowhere is this more evident than in the leaching of power away from a once-dominant America to an increasingly confident China. The BRICS framework, like the G7 to which it is often compared, has underachieved for much of its existence. Yet this may be changing. Xi’s presence in New Delhi marks his first visit to India in seven years – the latest stage in a gradual rapprochement between the two largest Asian powers. More importantly, it signals Beijing’s determination to promote China as a responsible global actor in contrast to a delinquent, rules-busting America. Working with India and other non-Western powers is essential to this project. Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin and India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi during the BRICS Business Forum in New Delhi on 11 September (Photo: Dmitry Azarov/AFP) But it is Donald Trump who has been the primary, if unwitting, instrument of Beijing’s ambitions. No US President could have done more. His actions and pronouncements have discredited the post-Cold War liberal order. Transatlantic relations are in crisis, and the very idea of ‘the West’ is in question. Countries the world over, including many allies, are rushing to hedge against Trumpian chaos and extortion. And the limitations of American power have been brutally exposed by a series of foreign policy failures, from last year’s climbdown over tariffs against China to the disastrous war on Iran. Bilaterally, too, things are going swimmingly for Beijing. Trump has been singularly dovish – or indifferent – on Taiwan, and there are genuine hopes in Beijing that Washington will not seriously oppose the island’s early reunification with the mainland. Moreover, Xi appears to believe that he can reach a broader accommodation, in line with the joint commitment to a “constructive relationship of strategic stability” announced during Trump’s May 2026 state visit to Beijing. The Trump window However, Beijing knows it has a limited window to capitalise on Trump’s failings. Trump’s second presidential term ends in January 2029, while midterm elections this November are expected to change the balance of power in one if not both houses of Congress. Regardless of whether Trump is succeeded by a Republican or a Democrat, American attitudes towards China will most likely revert to the mean, namely, the view that it represents the greatest threat to American power and primacy. Post-Trump, the relationship will almost certainly become more hostile, with confrontation a real possibility. It is improbable, for example, that a future US president would allow Beijing the latitude it currently enjoys over Taiwan and in the South China Sea. It is debatable, too, whether Beijing can count on Trump being so compliant in the remaining two-and-a-half years of his presidency. While he may continue to blunder around, alienating allies and partners and pushing non-aligned nations to gravitate towards China, Trump could also lash out against Beijing. For if there is one constant in his approach to international affairs, it is a pathological need to “win”. Being embarrassed by Xi in public is not part of the game plan. Media coverage of their May summit was acutely uncomfortable for Trump; reprising this spectacle in future meetings, such as the return summit in Washington later this month, will only reinforce the impression that the Chinese leader is taking him for a ride. That will become harder to swallow and increase the pressure on Trump to prove otherwise. Trump gestures towards Chinese President Xi Jinping during his visit to Beijing, China in May (Photo: Evan Vucci/ Reuters) China’s dangerous hubris With China’s fortunes in the ascendancy, introspection in Beijing is limited. Not only does it believe that the balance of global power is inexorably shifting in its favour, but also that it should take advantage of a disorderly international context to speed up the process. There are growing signs of Chinese overreach. Although Xi appears to have ruled out an early invasion of Taiwan, Beijing continues to challenge Washington’s red lines, casually disregards European trade interests, and stokes the security anxieties of Asian neighbours from India to Japan and the Philippines. Underpinning this is the feeling that China can act more or less as it sees fit. In Beijing’s narrative, China is the natural – indeed only – alternative to America. Even if other countries sometimes resent its behaviour, they have little choice but to play by China’s rules. But such assumptions are dangerous. As alarmed as they are by Trump’s excesses, few governments wish to see China supplant the United States as global leader. One hegemon is as bad – or worse – than the other. There are no illusions, including in the Global South, that Chinese foreign policy is anything other than self-serving, notwithstanding Beijing’s pronouncements about “win-win” outcomes and the “democratisation” of international relations. The notion of China as the saviour of international order is scarcely shared beyond its borders. China is no benign global actor It is also doubtful whether Beijing is ready to assume the burdens of global leadership. It prizes influence and status, not the responsibilities of global governance. While its economic footprint stretches across the world, geopolitically China is not much more than a regional power. Xi talks of a “shared future for humanity”, and has presided over various vision statements, such as the four Global Initiatives on development, security, civilisation and governance. But such documents are light on substance, while Beijing’s “peace” diplomacy over Ukraine and in the Middle East has been essentially performative. Looking ahead, the disjunction between the official image of China as a benign global actor and its single-minded pursuit of national interests will be stark. Beijing will focus more than ever on “core” priorities – reunification of Taiwan with the mainland, asserting territorial and maritime “rights” in the South China Sea and western Pacific, and boosting China’s “comprehensive” (multi-dimensional) national power. While Xi’s presence in New Delhi may hint at a softer, more generous foreign policy, his commitment to realising China’s strategic ambitions is undiminished. The symbolism of the BRICS summit works for Beijing precisely because it legitimises and advertises China’s global credentials while entailing minimal commitments. And this is likely to remain the pattern over the next few months – at the Trump-Xi summit in Washington, at the UN General Assembly, and at the Shenzhen APEC summit in November. All the while, Xi will look to chip away at American credibility and authority, and steadily improve China’s terms of engagement with the rest of the world. Bobo Lo is an independent international relations analyst and non-resident fellow of the Lowy Institute. Previously, he was head of the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House and deputy head of mission at the Australian Embassy in Moscow. He has written many books and articles, including his latest, The Disorderly Society: Rethinking Global Governance in an Age of Anarchy