The Sahel, a new front in the rivalry between Algeria and Morocco

For decades, the rivalry between Algeria and Morocco has played out mainly around Western Sahara and the question of leadership in the Maghreb. A former Spanish colony, Western Sahara is claimed by Rabat, which controls most of it, while Algiers supports the Polisario Front, which demands a UN‑backed self‑determination referendum for the Sahrawi people. In parallel, the two countries have competed since independence for the role of leading power in the Maghreb. These disputes, among others, have led to severe diplomatic tensions: their border has been closed since 1994 and relations severed since 2021. Today, however, this rivalry is projecting further south, into the Sahel. Diplomacy, security, infrastructure, energy, trade and religion: the region has become a new arena where the two North African states seek to consolidate their positions amid rapid geopolitical shifts. New MEE newsletter: Jerusalem Dispatch Sign up to get the latest insights and analysis on Israel-Palestine, alongside Turkey Unpacked and other MEE newsletters Meanwhile, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger - united within the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) - are also trying to diversify their partners as they distance themselves from several of their former Western allies. It is in this space that Algeria and Morocco now find themselves neck‑and‑neck. Algiers bets on security and proximity For Algeria, the Sahel is first and foremost a matter of national security. Mali and Niger share long borders with Algeria, meaning their political and security developments have direct consequences for Algiers. Armed groups, cross‑border trafficking, political instability south of its frontier - these are challenges Algeria cannot ignore. This reality is pushing Algiers to gradually revise a doctrine long based on non‑intervention abroad. ‘Algeria does not make its decisions based on Morocco’ - Jalel Harchaoui, Royal United Services Institute On 30 August, the day after an attempted coup in Niamey, it sent four Su‑30 fighter jets to Niger at the request of local authorities. On 25 October, the Algerian parliament then approved the deployment of troops in Niger - a first since 1973. Algeria is also seeking to regain a diplomatic role in a region where its influence had been weakened by crises with Bamako and Niamey. The rift with Mali dates back to December 2023, when Mali accused Algeria of interference in its internal affairs, and both countries recalled their ambassadors. It was followed by Bamako’s denunciation in January 2024 of the so‑called Algiers peace agreement - a 2015 accord meant to stabilise northern Mali. It widened to the entire AES in April 2025 after Algeria shot down a Malian drone, with each side claiming it was flying in its own airspace. The three AES countries then recalled their ambassadors, as did Algiers. Since then, relations with Niamey have significantly improved. At the same time, Morocco is also advancing its interests in the Sahel, even though it shares no border with AES states. Jalel Harchaoui, an analyst affiliated with the Royal United Services Institute, urges observers to assess each country separately. ​​​​​​Sahel instability pushes Algeria to rethink its long-standing non‑intervention doctrine Read More » “It’s not about seeing Morocco everywhere,” he told Middle East Eye. Morocco’s presence is significant in Mali, he says, but far more limited in Niger. He also warns against interpreting every Algerian decision through the lens of Morocco. “Algeria does not make its decisions based on Morocco,” Harchaoui said. According to him, Algerian choices are driven primarily by concrete security considerations, starting with the situation in Mali and Niger. Harchaoui notes a recent shift in Bamako and Niamey, where authorities now take more seriously Algerian analyses advocating a political approach to the Tuareg question rather than purely military solutions. The Tuaregs - Berber communities in northern Mali, Niger and southern Algeria - have demanded greater autonomy and recognition since independence, facing centralised states they consider neglectful. This longstanding grievance has sparked several rebellions, including the 2012 uprising in Mali. The 2015 Algiers peace agreement, brokered by Algeria, was meant to address it. This evolution reflects a renewed Algerian influence in the Sahel, driven by its geographic proximity, its deep knowledge of local dynamics and its experience managing Tuareg crises. Rabat advances through the economy Morocco, for its part, has chosen a different approach, less focused on security. “Morocco is constantly working to strengthen economic, religious, cultural and diplomatic ties with Sahelian states,” Rida Lyammouri, senior fellow at the Policy Center for the New South (PCNS) and an independent Sahel consultant, told MEE. Moroccan banks are already present in several African countries, and Rabat relies on this financial network - along with its investments - to reinforce its economic footprint. ‘Morocco is constantly working to strengthen economic, religious, cultural and diplomatic ties with Sahelian states’ - Rida Lyammouri, Policy Center for the New South (PCNS) In addition, the kingdom develops agricultural partnerships and training programmes, including for imams, which serve as tools of religious cooperation. In April 2025, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger also endorsed the Moroccan Atlantic Initiative in Rabat, aimed at offering landlocked Sahelian states access to the West African coast through Moroccan port infrastructure. This initiative signals the kingdom’s ambition beyond trade: creating an economic corridor linking Morocco to West Africa and the Sahel. The Dakhla-Nouakchott transport and economic integration project illustrates this strategy. A framework agreement signed in September between Morocco and Mauritania provides for the rehabilitation and expansion of the RN4 road, within a broader axis connecting Dakhla in southern Western Sahara, the Guerguerat border post, and Nouadhibou and Nouakchott in Mauritania. The future Dakhla Atlantic port, scheduled to enter service in 2028, is intended to provide a maritime outlet for this strategy. ‘A blatant affront’: Israeli embassy upgrade angers pro-Palestine voices in Morocco Read More » Mauritania thus becomes a key link, positioned at the crossroads of Moroccan ambitions and Algerian interests in the region. Algeria and Morocco embody two opposing corridor logics: Algeria traditionally projects its influence toward the Sahel through its southern borders and trans‑Saharan networks; Morocco is developing an Atlantic route through Mauritania. Both models rest on the same conviction: in a landlocked Sahel, infrastructure and access to markets can become instruments of power. Energy also enters the equation, with the Nigeria-Morocco gas pipeline project expected to cross Mauritania. This roughly 6,000km pipeline, still awaiting financing, competes with the trans‑Saharan Nigeria-Niger-Algeria project, whose construction began on the Algerian side in June. Both routes aim to bring Nigerian gas to the European market. The United Arab Emirates appears in the background of this competition: Abu Dhabi is financing and developing infrastructure and port networks in Mauritania, potentially strengthening the Moroccan axis. Algeria views the strategic rapprochement between Abu Dhabi and Rabat - and Emirati support for Morocco’s positions on Western Sahara - with suspicion. This mistrust is part of a broader context of bilateral tensions that culminated in September with the severing of diplomatic relations between Algeria and the UAE, amid Algerian accusations of hostile actions and regional interference. The active role of Sahelian states Rearmament accompanies the economic and diplomatic competition. Algeria remains by far Africa’s top military spender: according to SIPRI, it allocated around $25.4bn to defence in 2025, an 11 percent increase year‑on‑year. Morocco spent around $6.3bn, up 6.6 percent, ranking second on the continent. While this military rivalry may raise fears of escalation, it does not necessarily make the Sahel a future theatre of direct confrontation between Algiers and Rabat - instead illustrating that strategic competition now extends beyond Maghreb borders. ‘The fundamental question is whether Sahelian states can turn this competition into an opportunity to strengthen their strategic autonomy’ - Oumar Keita, president of the Sahel‑Africa Institute for Diplomacy and Influence (Isadi) Oumar Keita, former Malian ambassador to Unesco and the president of the Sahel‑Africa Institute for Diplomacy and Influence (Isadi), rejects the idea that this arms race will lead to military confrontation between the neighbours. “I would speak more of a competition for positioning and influence than of confrontation,” he told MEE. Keita stresses that the Sahel should not be seen as “a vacant space” where external powers simply exert influence. For AES countries, this competition can be both a constraint and an opportunity. The Sahelian juntas, seeking to reduce dependence on France and other Western partners, have developed close ties with Russia. However, this alone does not meet their needs in investment, roads, energy, commercial outlets and security cooperation. Competition between Algiers and Rabat therefore offers them more options. Keita argues that Sahelian states must avoid choosing a single camp and instead pursue a “diplomacy of diversification” based on multiple, complementary partnerships. The risk, he says, is replacing one dependency with another. “Lasting influence cannot be decreed. It is built through trust, continuity of commitments and tangible results for populations.” Exclusive: Mali’s Tuareg separatists seek Turkey talks, reveal Russian contact Read More » This is likely the main test for both Algiers and Rabat. Morocco currently holds an advantage in the economic and infrastructure sectors. Algeria retains unique geographic proximity along with security and diplomatic experience, particularly with Mali and Niger. But neither power controls the Sahel. The region remains shaped by its own political crises, local conflicts, armed groups and the sovereign choices of Sahelian governments. “The question is therefore not whether Algiers or Rabat will gain more influence in the Sahel. The fundamental question is whether Sahelian states can turn this competition into an opportunity to strengthen their strategic autonomy, development and collective ability to defend their interests,” Keïta said. Two indicators will quickly reveal how this dynamic evolves: the commissioning of the Dakhla Atlantic port, expected in 2028, and Algeria’s ability to translate its diplomatic return in Bamako and Niamey into concrete, visible projects.