[Puso at diwa] Anti-political dynasties: When democracy belongs to the people

The Philippines' 1987 Constitution mandates Congress to prohibit political dynasties, but it took nearly four decades for the House of Representatives to pass the Anti-Political Dynasty Act, which critics argue is too narrow in scope. Three initiatives have emerged in response to the slow legislative action: the House bill, the Dapat Isa Lang people's initiative advocating for a more comprehensive anti-dynasty law, and a Supreme Court ruling compelling Congress to fulfill its constitutional duty. The challenge now lies in whether Congress can enact a law that genuinely addresses political dynasties and prevents their perpetuation, as political dynasties are linked to weaker political competition and accountability, impacting the country's development. This is AI-generated. Read the article for full context. Report any errors. For nearly four decades, the Philippines has carried in its 1987 Constitution a command that Congress conspicuously failed to implement: “The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.” Article II, Section 26 of the 1987 Constitution was meant to open political competition and prevent public office from becoming a family inheritance. Yet it took the Lower House 39 years to produce an enabling measure. And when it finally did, the measure itself became controversial. The House of Representatives approved House Bill No. 8389, the Anti-Political Dynasty Act, in June by an overwhelming 267-20 vote. It was principally authored by Speaker Faustino “Bojie” Dy III and Majority Leader Ferdinand Alexander “Sandro” Marcos, the President’s son. The irony has not been lost on its critics. But the more important issue is not who authored the bill. It is what the bill actually prohibits. Critics argue that the House measure is too narrow, particularly because its restrictions are focused on close relatives and particular circumstances of simultaneous occupancy of elective positions. Such a framework could permit political families to reproduce themselves through succession, more distant relatives, changes in jurisdiction, substitutions or political allies. This is precisely why three different but complementary initiatives have emerged. Three initiatives Congress has acted. Civil society has challenged it. The Supreme Court has now compelled Congress to finish the job. The first response came from Congress itself. Its supporters argue that HB 8389 is a realistic and enforceable beginning after decades of legislative paralysis. But a law can be politically achievable and still fall short of the constitutional purpose it is intended to serve. The second response is Dapat Isa Lang (D1L), a multisectoral people’s initiative seeking what its proponents call a genuine anti-political dynasty law. Its proposed measure extends the prohibition to relatives within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity and would limit a political family to one national and one local elective position. It also addresses successive occupation of positions, substitution, switching of positions and a cooling-off period after term limits. Image from Dapat Isa Lang Movement FB Bishop Gerardo Alminaza of San Carlos has urged Negrenses and Filipinos to support the movement. His intervention is important because the issue is being framed not as an assault on a particular political clan but as a question of the common good: whether public service remains genuinely open to citizens beyond established political families. The third, and now decisive, development is the intervention of the Supreme Court. On Wednesday, September 16, the Court announced its unanimous ruling on the consolidated petitions led by the 1Sambayan Coalition, including retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Antonio Carpio and former Ombudsman Conchita Carpio Morales. The Court held that Congress has a mandatory constitutional duty to define and prohibit political dynasties and that its failure to enact an enabling law for 39 years constituted grave abuse of discretion. It directed Congress to discharge that duty with “utmost urgency.” This changes the terrain. The question is no longer whether Congress should enact an anti-dynasty law. The constitutional obligation has now been judicially affirmed. (READ: Why the SC is telling Congress to do its job on political dynasties) Enacting a law consistent with constitutional intent The harder question is whether Congress will enact a law faithful to the constitutional objective, and whether that law can survive the ingenuity of political families determined to preserve their influence. Political dynasties are not merely genealogical arrangements. They are networks of name recognition, financial resources, political machinery, local alliances and institutional access. A prohibition confined to immediate relatives may therefore be circumvented by succession through cousins, nephews or other relatives; by moving family members across constituencies; by having relatives alternate positions; or by using political allies and substitutes to preserve control. The test of an anti-dynasty law is thus not simply whether it prevents two members of one family from holding two offices simultaneously. It is whether it prevents the perpetuation and concentration of political power. This matters because political competition is itself an institution. Democracy is more than the periodic counting of votes. It requires genuine contestability: the possibility that incumbents can lose, that newcomers can compete, and that citizens without inherited political machinery can seek public office. The empirical literature does not justify claiming that political dynasties alone explain Philippine underdevelopment. Indeed, the evidence is more nuanced. A 2016 study found a worsening effect of dynasties on poverty particularly outside Luzon. A 2022 study found that dynasties exacerbated poverty in resource-rich non-Luzon provinces, while the relationship was weaker in Luzon where more competitive business environments provided a counterweight. More recent research similarly emphasizes that the effects vary with local economic and institutional conditions. Evidence supports institutional concern But the evidence does support a broader institutional concern. Political inequality, or concentration of elective positions among dynastic families, has been associated with weaker development outcomes. And the latest Philippine policy research notes that dynastic concentration can limit political competition, weaken accountability and influence the allocation of the national budget. The economic backdrop makes this institutional question more urgent. The Philippines grew by 5.7% in 2024, but growth slowed to 4.4% in 2025 and to just 2.6% on average in the first half of 2026, based on first- and second-quarter Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) data. This does not establish that political dynasties caused the slowdown. Development depends on many factors including productivity, investment, human capital, infrastructure, governance, and external conditions. But it does sharpen the question of why the country has struggled to translate decades of economic growth into stronger productivity, investment and institutional performance. That is where political reform becomes an economic issue. Institutions that permit prolonged political concentration can weaken competition and accountability. And where political and economic power overlap, the capacity of government to allocate resources impartially, enforce rules consistently and execute long-term development plans can also be compromised. Two-fold challenge The challenge now is therefore twofold. First, can Congress produce a law that genuinely fulfills the Supreme Court’s constitutional directive rather than merely satisfying it formally? Second, can the law be designed so that political dynasties cannot simply adapt around it? The answer will depend on details that are easy to dismiss as technical but are actually fundamental: the degree of relationship covered; simultaneous versus successive occupancy; territorial restrictions; substitution; term limits; cooling-off periods; enforcement; disclosure of family relationships; and the treatment of political surrogates. After 39 years, the Philippines should be wary of celebrating legislative movement as constitutional fulfillment. The Constitution did not promise equal access to public service eventually. It commanded it. Congress now has its mandate from the Constitution and its marching orders from the Supreme Court. Civil society has offered another route through the D1L movement. And the people retain their constitutional power to participate directly in legislation. The ultimate issue is therefore larger than the Marcoses, Dys, Dutertes, Aquinos, Villars or any other political clan. It is whether public office belongs to the people—or whether, over time, it becomes something that political families can inherit, reproduce and defend. That is the real test of political democracy. And after 39 years, it is a test the Philippines can no longer postpone. – Rappler.com ALSO ON RAPPLER Centuries in the making: Singsons’ unrivaled power in Ilocos Sur The Villafuertes of CamSur: A tale of political survival and reinvention How the Romualdezes held their political grip on Leyte for generations When you see the Ynares name, you know you’re in Rizal The Pinedas of Pampanga: A dynasty by succession The Dutertes’ 40-year reign: Forged from strongman and victim Ilocos Norte: In Marcoses’ ‘political project,’ loyalty is not blind References: Ronald U. Mendoza, Edsel L. Beja Jr., Victor S. Venida, and David B. Yap. (2016). “Political Dynasties and Poverty: Measurement and Evidence of Linkages in the Philippines.” Oxford Development Studies, 44(2), 189–201. Ronald U. Mendoza, Jurel K. Yap, Gabrielle Ann S. Mendoza, Leonardo Jaminola III, and Erica Celine Yu. (2022) “Political Dynasties, Business, and Poverty in the Philippines,” Journal of Government and Economics, Vol. 7, Article 100051. Diwa C. Guinigundo is the former deputy governor for monetary policy and other aspects of central banking. He was a former alternate executive director at the IMF in Washington, DC in 2001-2003. He is the author and editor of several books on political economy, regional crisis and cooperation, debt and economic growth and public policy agenda. He serves as independent director of several corporate and financial institutions with focus on corporate governance, risk oversight and audit. He also serves as principal advisor for New York-based GlobalSourcePartners. He remains in the advisory board of ASEAN Macroeconomic Research Office and Singapore Management University’s Sim Kee Boon Institute for Financial Economics. He is the senior pastor of the Fullness of Christ International Ministries in Mandaluyong. Below are other Puso at Diwa columns by the author: