Poland is Trying to Insure Itself Against Another Yalta

Poland knows from bitter experience that even powerful allies cannot always be relied upon when it matters most. Now, as talk grows of a possible grand meeting between Washington, Moscow and Beijing—eerily reminiscent of the Yalta Conference—Warsaw is trying to make the prospect of abandonment more expensive. The announcement on Tuesday of a European servicing centre for American PAC-3 Patriot interceptors fits a policy pursued by successive Polish governments, which is to draw Western troops, technology and defense industry into Poland until its security becomes a practical interest for its allies. JOIN US ON TELEGRAMFollow our coverage of the war on the @Kyivpost_official. But America could have a great deal invested in Poland and still decide that its interests lie elsewhere. That is the dilemma behind the latest announcement. In September 1939, Britain and France declared war on Germany but could not save Poland. Six years later, with the Red Army occupying Polish territory, Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin determined Poland’s future at Yalta without a Polish representative at the table. Of course, today’s Poland has NATO membership, stronger armed forces and American troops already on its soil. Yet its history offers the warning that powerful allies can have good reasons to defend you and still fail when their capabilities or priorities point elsewhere. The cost of walking away Poland beat Germany, the Netherlands and Norway to host the PAC-3 centre, which will repair and recertify interceptors used by European NATO countries. Other Topics of Interest US, Russia Discuss Oil Deals in Ukraine Peace Talks – FT Proposed US-Russia deals include Sakhalin oil production, Druzhba exports, and access to Russian airspace, according to the Financial Times. At present, European NATO countries have to send their PAC-3 interceptor missiles back to the United States for technical inspections and certification to ensure they remain safe and ready for use. Polish Deputy Defence Minister Magdalena Sobkowiak-Czarnecka says the shipping, work and return take “more than a year”. Doing that work in Poland should shorten the delay. Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden will also participate in the supply chain. And that is where Poland gains leverage. The more Europe’s air defences depend on Polish facilities to keep their missiles operational, the more its allies have to lose if Poland’s security is threatened. Britain signed a three-year defence plan with Warsaw on the same day, building on cooperation in drones, ammunition and the Narew air-defence system. Under an earlier MBDA agreement, Polish industry is to manufacture more than 1,000 CAMM-ER missiles. British Defence Secretary Wes Streeting spoke of “a stronger Europe in a stronger NATO”. For Warsaw, the attraction is a web of contracts, technology and operational needs that give its allies something tangible to lose. Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin at Yalta in February 1945, where Poland's future was negotiated without its government at the table. (Photo by: Circa Images/GHI/Universal History Archive/Universal Images Group via Getty Images) President Karol Nawrocki is pursuing the military version of the same idea. He has called a National Security Council meeting for November 3 to discuss the long-sought-after permanent American base, adding to the existing US military presence. The logic is straightforward. Poland is safer when its allies have more than a moral or legal obligation to defend it. American troops, missile facilities and defence contracts give them something concrete to lose, whether in the unlikely event of a Russian invasion or the more plausible scenario of Washington and Moscow negotiating spheres of influence over Warsaw’s head. The hope is that compromising Poland’s security would also damage the interests of those making the decisions. But the imbalance remains: Poland still needs America far more than America needs Poland. The shadow of another Yalta That imbalance matters as Moscow explores a grand bargain with Washington and Beijing. According to The Wall Street Journal, Putin has proposed meeting Donald Trump and Xi Jinping during November’s APEC summit in China to discuss Ukraine. The meeting is unconfirmed, and there is no evidence that the three powers have agreed to divide Europe into spheres of influence. Still, the prospect of talks about European security without Europeans recalls an uncomfortable history. Some commentary suggests Europe may finally be finding its way into the peace process. Putin’s adviser Yuri Ushakov said on Sunday that “it’s not enough to talk only to Kyiv”, adding that Europe had to be addressed too. There was a catch. Ushakov did not say Moscow intended to negotiate with European governments as equals. In context, he could just as easily have been asking Washington to put pressure on them. And an attempt on Tuesday at direct European diplomacy did little to dispel that suspicion. Finnish President Alexander Stubb and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre (pictured) sought direct talks with Putin, exposing disagreements over European diplomacy. (Photo by Paula Bronstein/Getty Images) Putin’s history lesson Finnish President Alexander Stubb and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre initiated a call with Putin ahead of planned peace talks in Abu Dhabi possibly in the first half of November. According to the Financial Times, the Russian president spent much of the 90-minute conversation giving them the Tucker Carlson treatment: a rambling lecture on medieval Slavic history, much like the one he delivered to the American broadcaster during his 2024 interview about the invasion of Ukraine. There was little discussion of an immediate ceasefire and no visible concession. “There were no surprises in the positions that Putin put forward,” Stubb acknowledged afterwards. It is difficult to see what was learnt that justified the diplomatic disruption. Denmark and Sweden questioned the initiative. Estonia said it had been informed, without taking part in substantive coordination. And Stubb and Støre stressed that they were speaking only for their own countries. To be fair, Ukraine was consulted and Zelenskyy welcomed the call. Direct contact can have value. But Russia wages sabotage and coercion across Europe, while European governments still struggle to agree who should speak to Moscow. Putin can deal with individual capitals without accepting a united European negotiating position. There was a revealing irony in Stubb’s speech to the Nordic Council later that day. Small countries, he argued, should ask “in what areas others depend on us”. That could serve as a description of Poland’s industrial strategy. Yet the call exposed the difficulty of translating common European interests into a common diplomatic voice. And that brings us back to Warsaw. An American missile centre and British production ties may make abandonment costlier but they cannot compel an American president to put Polish security ahead of a wider deal with Moscow.