Opinion: 3 lessons from the tobacco settlement on how states should use money from Meta

When I became the first executive director of the country’s oldest statewide tobacco control coalition in 1999, conversations were already underway about how Colorado should spend its share of funds distributed to states from the landmark tobacco settlement. Unsurprisingly, interest groups from across our state came forward to argue why their priorities deserved a portion of Colorado’s share of settlement dollars. While policymakers considered how to spend the state’s portion of the settlement, my job was to go to communities across Colorado and explain why a significant portion of the funds should go to tobacco prevention and education programs, rather than unrelated, even if deserving, programs. I’ve been thinking about that experience in the wake of the $18 billion legal settlement between almost all states and social media giant Meta. Colorado Attorney General Phil Weiser and others have noted parallels between the two. As states make plans, it’s worth reflecting on lessons learned from the tobacco settlement nearly three decades ago. The 1998 tobacco settlement numbers were monumental: States would receive $200 billion to resolve lawsuits against Big Tobacco for its history of harm. States had to determine where their share of the money should go. Before 1999, I had only a basic understanding of what led up to the tobacco settlement — beyond the now-historic clips of tobacco industry executives testifying under oath before the U.S. Congress and saying, one after another, that they believed nicotine was not addictive. I did know, however, that the tobacco settlement would be a game-changer, and in many ways, it was. It directed hundreds of millions of dollars to states to fund programs. It restricted tobacco marketing that targeted youth, like the cartoon character Joe Camel, and funded the Truth Initiative, a tobacco prevention organization that still exists. It also led to the release of millions of industry documents, which provided explicit detail about the companies’ exploitative efforts to addict various populations and fight public health protections. The easily searchable online database offered a treasure trove of material for researchers and journalists, confirming some of our worst suspicions about the industry. But in other areas, the tobacco settlement fell short of its goals. These missteps offer insights for the Meta settlement spending. For one, the tobacco settlement didn’t specify how states could spend the funds, so it was open season for anyone searching for funding for unrelated projects. While some states spent money to fill budget holes or (in the Carolinas) even subsidize tobacco producers, Colorado appropriated most of its money to health-related programs, though almost all have no direct nexus to tobacco. As a result, according to the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, tobacco prevention is chronically shortchanged to this day: In fiscal year 2026, “total state funding for these programs amounts to just 3.4% of the $21.7 billion in revenue the states will collect from tobacco settlement payments and tobacco taxes.” Meanwhile, the shape-shifting tobacco industry continued to innovate new methods to hook new and young users, with teen-friendly sweet and fruity flavors leading to a surge in teen vaping and, more recently, highly potent oral nicotine products like Zyn. From the legislature to city halls, tobacco industry lobbyists and dollars remain omnipresent today, fighting efforts to restrict flavored products, for example. On the positive side, the tobacco settlement spurred prevention programs to work together to address tobacco and other public health issues. The early 2000s brought a strong focus on educating communities about the harms of secondhand smoke and successful policies to restrict smoking in public places. There were also successful campaigns in Colorado and other states to increase the price of tobacco, a policy move proven to reduce smoking in adults and youth and fund prevention and cessation efforts. These and other efforts built on the experience and trust forged through decades of policy battles, including the tobacco settlement, even if the dollars weren’t involved. If I could speak directly to the people now in charge of distributing funds from the Meta settlement, I’d like to offer them three pieces of advice. First, don’t rely on the industry to protect youth when its business model depends on hooking new customers and keeping them using their product. As the saying goes, fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, shame on me. Whether it’s nicotine or algorithms, the result is the same: reinforcing a behavior that is harmful to users. Policymakers and advocates need to promote laws and regulations to protect youth, following the evidence of what’s proven to halt cycles of addiction. Second, use settlement dollars to emphasize youth prevention and support initiatives with generation-spanning benefits. While addressing immediate harm is key, research related to substance use, for example, shows long-term prevention provides the highest return on investment. Finally, consider that the movement to protect kids from these harms is just beginning and will require constant evolution and vigilance to adapt to emerging threats. Since the tobacco industry promised to change its ways, it has continually innovated new ways to deliver nicotine to users, with increased potency and efficiency. The breakneck pace of the evolution — or devolution — of technology will only accelerate, and we have learned we cannot trust tech companies to police themselves. When companies won’t do the right thing themselves, litigation has proven effective at checking their excesses. However, legal solutions aren’t enough without forward-looking policy and sustained accountability. Susan Morrisey headed the Colorado Tobacco Education and Prevention Alliance in the late 1990s and is now a principal with SE2, a behavior-change marketing agency that has worked on tobacco prevention for three decades.