New York Times Blames Trump For Air Safety Risks—Gets Blasted By The Independent NTSB

The National Transportation Safety Board says the New York Times distorted its comments to attack President Trump. The paper’s aviation safety story has bigger problems than just politics. It gets a major crash wrong and credits a pilot hours rule for a safety record that began years before the rule took effect. James Fallows’s “Is Air Travel Getting Less Safe?” describes real issues of overworked air traffic controllers, military aircraft operating around passenger flights, and safety recommendations that haven’t been adequately addressed. Then it tries to turn them into a story about Trump dismantling the institutions that keep us safe, even though the issues he cites have been going on far longer than the current administration. I’ve written predominantly critically about Trump since he first ran for president 11 years ago. I rejected his effort to blame diversity hiring for the American Airlines 5342 tragedy before investigators had established what happened. That doesn’t make every argument against him a good one. The Times introduces Fallows as an instrument-rated private pilot with more than 2,000 hours. That’s true but while he’s written extensively about aviation it’s an odd way to frame him as author of this story. He’s also Jimmy Carter’s former chief speechwriter, a longtime Atlantic writer and editor, and a familiar voice on NPR. His career has been about politics and public policy. His own introduction to the article frames the piece as meant to connect aviation under Trump with public health, international aid, diplomacy, higher education and the rule of law. Aviation is the vehicle for a larger political point. The piece isn’t really about aviation, it’s using aviation. The Independent NTSB Attacks The Piece The NTSB says the article: Distorts the agency’s responses with political statements intended to attack the current administration. Mischaracterizes the NTSB’s role in the 1,500 hour pilot requirement. Incorrectly implies negligence by the Black Hawk pilots involved in the Washington National Airport collision. The statement also thanks the administration for supporting the agency and providing resources. That last part is political messaging too. (Gratitude for a budget doesn’t answer address aviation safety, but is probably necessary as a defensive measure.) “We are disappointed that this article sensationalizes and politicizes tragedies.” The NTSB’s response to the New York Times Magazine. — NTSB Newsroom (@NTSB_Newsroom) November 12, 2026 Fallows interviewed NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy. The agency argues she’s being mischaracterized, but they don’t actually say how. In the article she says, “Recommendations alone don’t save lives. Action does.” Her own July statement about the Washington crash warned that delays implementing the board’s recommendations represented a continuing, unacceptable risk. The Article Gets The Colgan Air Crash Wrong Fallows spends considerable space describing the 2009 Colgan Air crash near Buffalo – as the last U.S. airline crash with loss of life before American 5342. In fact, PenAir flight 3296 overran the runway at Unalaska in October 2019, killing a passenger. His account has the Colgan Air plane accumulating ice until it becomes a “frigid brick.” He writes that by the time the captain recognized the problem, it “might already have become unflyable.” But that isn’t what the investigation found. The FAA’s accident analysis says icing wasn’t a cause. When the stall warning activated, the airplane wasn’t yet stalled. The captain pulled back on the controls and put it into a stall. The crew had failed to monitor their airspeed and mishandled the approach. And both Colgan pilots already had more than 1,500 hours: The captain had 3,379 hours. The captain had a history of training failures despite the hours. The first officer had 2,244 hours, including 1,470 hours as a light airplane flight instructor and 774 hours in turbine aircraft. The 1,500 Hour Rule For Co-Pilots Isn’t The Reason For The Safety Improvements After Colgan, Congress and regulators made several changes. Pilot rest rules improved. Training changed. Pilot qualification requirements changed. Sharing pilot records improved. Evidence that safety has performed well after a package of changes doesn’t establish that (1) every element of those changes (2) caused the improvements. And there’s strong reason to believe the the 1,500 hour rule has the opposite effect. It makes becoming a pilot take far longer and become far more costly, which keeps talented people from becoming pilots. Those with a higher opportunity cost, or lacking access to resources needed, get excluded from the pool of potential pilots. You’re then drawing from a smaller group. The NTSB didn’t recommend the 1,500 hour number. In 2010 Senate testimony, then-chair Deborah Hersman explained that the board had investigated accidents involving both high-time and low-time pilots. It found a relationship between failed practical tests and subsequent accidents, but there wasn’t evidence that number of hours actually mattered. The higher minimum took effect in 2013. Fallows’s safety streak begins in February 2009. The first four and a half years of that streak can’t be credited to a requirement that wasn’t yet in effect. Making pilots chase hours can allow relevant skills to deteriorate and bad habits to develop before an airline has to train those habits out of them. Repeated flights in clear weather, making takeoffs and landings at the same familiar airports, aren’t equivalent to structured training for instrument flying in a jet with another pilot, airline procedures, and complex air traffic control instructions. Hours in a hot air balloon count. The hot air balloon can be tethered. European co-pilots don’t face the same restriction, but their safety record is equivalent. Sub-1,500 hour European pilots fly in the United States every day without concern (and American pilots fly in Europe without elevated risk). The argument for the rule is that experience can build judgment, and that the higher threshold was part of a successful improvement in regional airline standards. But that’s an argument for useful experience and rigorous standards. That’s not what we got. An hour spent building time isn’t as valuable as an hour spent in a supervised airline training program. And there’s zero evidence that 1,500 is the right metric. It was chosen because it’s expensive and time-consuming, restricts entry into the pilot profession and drives up wages, and was supported by the major pilots union. The Black Hawk Crew Bears Responsibility The NTSB objected to Fallows implying negligence by the helicopter pilots. But its own probable cause finding identifies the helicopter crew’s failure to maintain effective visual separation as a cause of the collision. The crew accepted responsibility for avoiding the airliner and failed to do so. The existence of systemic failures don’t eliminate pilot error. In Homendy’s testimony explaining the findings, the board concluded that the helicopter’s altimeter probably understated its altitude by about 100 feet. The crew likely believed it was below the route’s ceiling. Fallows also describes the crew flying through civilian traffic without monitoring its traffic avoidance systems. The helicopter had no integrated cockpit traffic display. The pilots had tablets capable of showing traffic, but looking down at them while flying low at night with night vision goggles was problematic. Their audio alerts weren’t integrated into the pilots’ helmets. There were failures of FAA route design, and the FAA failed to act in the face of repeated warnings. But it’s genuinely weird to pin the blame for that on the first nine days of the Trump administration before the crash. I’ve criticized efforts to preserve military exceptions around Washington National. Civilian aviation shouldn’t have to accommodate unnecessary military risks. The Pentagon needs to change, and the current administration is responsible for making that happen. But it didn’t invent the culture that allowed these risks to exist in the first place. The Article’s Own Incident Data Doesn’t Support A Partisan Cause Fallows combines airline accidents, rocket debris, military encounters, airshow incidents and presidential flyovers which generally have different causes. And a list that attributes incidents while a given President is in office to that President doesn’t do a good job of evaluating what decisions caused those incidents. But more simply, even the article’s own figures for the most serious runway incursions are problematic for the Fallows narrative: 2023: 22 incidents. 2024: 7 incidents. 2025: 14 incidents. 2026 through October: 9 incidents. The increase from 2024 to 2025 looks dramatic – a doubling! But it’s still far lower than under Biden in 2023! These are relatively small numbers, and they don’t show a steadily worsening trend. (And there are more aircraft operations than in 2023.) Air Traffic Control Was Broken Before Trump Fallows points to deregulation and falling fares as sources of overcrowding. More people being able to afford to fly is a good thing, and flying is still safer than driving. The failure is an FAA air traffic organization system that hasn’t kept up with demand. The Times has done excellent reporting on this subject. In August 2023, I covered its investigation into 46 close calls in one month and roughly 300 near collisions in a year. Staffing shortages, fatigue, outdated equipment and a culture that tolerated recurring warnings weren’t the result of the 2024 election. Fallows discusses 132 union-represented FAA employees fired during the DOGE purge. Their union announced their reinstatement in March 2025. Firing them was disruptive, but he leaves out the reversal. And recruiting gamers doesn’t establish that the FAA is lowering controller standards. The FAA has been growing the top of the funnel but there’s no indication that unqualified people are being advanced in training to a greater degree. I’ve criticized Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy for counting initial trainee hires as progress, that strikes me as juking the stats but hasn’t been a safety issue. And the Trump administration is doing modernization work that’s valuable and that’s been ignored for decades even if I’m skeptical that it’s close to enough because they don’t seem to be addressing the management problems at the FAA that created failed technology investment and decades-long controller shortages in the first place. I’ve been critical of pouring money into the existing organization. We need to address how air traffic control is managed, how it buys equipment, how it finances long projects and how it’s held accountable for performance. We’d be far better off separating the air traffic control operator from its regulator, with stable funding and professional management, as Canada has done with its nonprofit provider. (HT: Paddle Your Own Kanoo) Topics on this page