This week, CNN reported that U.S. intelligence indicates Iran is developing plans to detonate a dirty bomb, or use a chemical weapon, in Washington against senior Trump administration officials. Officials say it is not imminent and are divided on whether Iran can pull it off. The White House says there are “no credible threats to the homeland.” Iran calls the report fabricated. Asked in Manila whether the threat is imminent, President Donald Trump said the United States takes it “very seriously because they happen to be crazy,” and that Iran will “pay a price the likes of which no country has ever paid before” if it attacks. Nothing is confirmed.A dirty bomb is not a nuclear weapon, but it is a weapon of mass destruction. It is a conventional explosive packed with radioactive material, and the real damage is panic and cleanup. To qualify as a WMD, there are three components: the material, the delivery method, and intent. I’ve studied this. Closely.Within weeks of Trump taking office in January 2025, I left my office located at the Saint Elizabeths complex in Washington, D.C., with a document in a folder marked “For Official Use Only.” Inside the folder was the first DHS-wide Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Strategy to be published. I’d recently been appointed the assistant secretary for countering weapons of mass destruction, for the second time. The strategy had been agreed on by all 17 Department of Homeland Security components. Most of it had been published in the last months of the Biden administration. It was missing a key component that I shall not disclose. My team had coordinated with all DHS components for agreement on the missing content, revised the document, and was resubmitting it for signature. “It’s a no-brainer,” said my policy lead, walking beside me across the front lawn of the Center Building, housing DHS headquarters staff. He was referring to the updated strategy and getting an early win for Trump. Five minutes later, we sat across from the most senior person at DHS. The incoming secretary was still being vetted for Senate confirmation and had not yet arrived at DHS. I was more than familiar with the strategy and its shortfalls. I’d helped add the missing component. As I briefed the most senior official at DHS at the time, I realized the importance of the document was not being comprehended. The meeting ended with a vague acknowledgment of the strategy and that the secretary may possibly be interested when she arrived. I never heard back from anyone.On the way back, I said to my policy lead, “There is no interest in the strategy. Countering WMD is not on anyone’s radar.” I still believe I was correct.Now, it’s back. As mentioned, I was the assistant secretary at CWMD twice and worked in the arena for more than a decade. I knew the top three WMD threats to the nation and could nearly recite the probabilities of occurrence and the extent of damage to be inflicted. Dirty bombs were on the list. The strategy the Biden administration left DHS with was a good effort, but insufficient. Hopefully the modified one I submitted to DHS headquarters will resurface and be implemented. The nation needs it.Within weeks, with a small contingent of my staff present, I was told in no uncertain terms by DHS headquarters that the office of CWMD was to be shut down. It was sunsetting, and the previous assistant secretary had declined the offer by Congress to have the office reauthorized for two years. I’d done a mission analysis for CWMD and determined that, instead of the 500 staff on hand, I could do the mission with fewer than 100. I presented to the Department of Government Efficiency and DHS headquarters. There was absolutely no interest in preserving the office, so I didn’t waste any more time arguing with headquarters. Congress had weighed in. The office was being dismantled. I spent the next few months ensuring the dismantling was well organized so that missions, personnel, and contracts were packaged in neat bundles to be distributed throughout DHS. As a recognition of my due diligence and efficiency, I was sent to the Federal Emergency Management Agency to dismantle or radically transform it. There, the FEMA Review Council got in my way, so FEMA remains much as it was when I arrived in May 2025.Shrinking an office is not the same as dropping the mission. Someone still has to own the work. In 2025, the office’s Securing the Cities program worked with more than 675 partners across 14 high-risk urban areas, including Washington, and its Mobile Detection Deployment Program conducted 132 operations in 43 states and territories. Then Congress stopped funding the office in the 2026 DHS spending bill, and the pieces went to other components. Radiological detection, including the portal monitors that scan more than 100 million vehicles a year at U.S. ports of entry, was transferred to Customs and Border Protection, the Coast Guard, the Transportation Security Administration, and the Secret Service. Securing the Cities and the Biological Support program went to FEMA. On Aug. 6, Rep. Bennie Thompson (D-MS) and Rep. Timothy Kennedy (D-NY) asked the Government Accountability Office to review the split, describing a portfolio “fractured across at least seven different DHS components.” If a device turned up in Washington tomorrow, whose phone rings? Without DHS’s CWMD office, it is indeed a mystery who gets the phone call and who coordinates the effort.So, we’re left with the Biden administration’s incomplete plan and no office at DHS for countering weapons of mass destruction. But it gets worse: FEMA has a role in the aftermath of a WMD impact. Most people associate FEMA with funding the cleanup after hurricanes, wildfires, floods, and tornadoes. There are no first responders at FEMA. It’s 18,000 bureaucrats parked in cubicles at FEMA headquarters in Washington or somewhere in the hinterlands, many of them living on per diem years in hotels and within arm’s reach of a Golden Corral. They are designated as the cleanup crew coordinator in manmade disasters.FLIGHT, FIASCO, AND FINGER-POINTINGWhile I was at FEMA, I took part in wargaming at the highest level to address just such things as dirty bombs. It’s the one thing I did at FEMA that nobody at DHS HQ or, for the most part, at FEMA ever questioned me about. Why? There were no contracts or money involved, so it was low priority. In other words, the bureaucrats at FEMA, save a few brave souls charged within Continuity of Government and Intelligence, didn’t care about it. Over the years, FEMA has moved away from its traditional civil defense role to be primarily a social services-oriented organization. In the wake of the wargames, the few civil defense-oriented personnel left at FEMA thanked me for my interest. They said they could not recall a previous administrator who had shown any interest. God help us.In the next days and weeks, there will likely be much said about countering WMD capability and plans. Know this: We would be much better prepared today had the strategy my office’s strategy — modified, coordinated for approval, and presented for signature — had been given more than a cursory hand wave at DHS in the early days of the Trump administration. Most of what you hear will be vague answers cobbled together for the press conference, not information grounded in study and war-gaming.David Richardson served as a senior official performing the duties of FEMA administrator. He is the author of Texas Flood, 4 July 2025: Power, Money, Politics, History, Bureaucracy and Tragedy.
Is Trump’s DHS ready if Iran detonates a dirty bomb in DC?
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