[Interview] Russia has never stopped thinking like an empire — here’s how it shapes and may break the Kremlin

First published in Deník N “Perhaps Russia was too successful for too long,” argues Czech political geographer Michael Romancov. Speaking with Petra Procházková in a Deník N podcast, the academic examines the vast scale of Russia’s empire and how historical narratives feed Kremlin expansionism today. Key questions: Why did Russia’s vast size mean strength and weakness simultaneously? Which powers were able to stop Russia’s imperial ambitions? How was Alaska used to reach present-day California? And why was Alaska ultimately sold off? Why did expansionism become so key in theories of Russian security? And why did Russian narratives fail to abandon this imperial mindset? Michael Romancov is a political geographer at the Institute of Political Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University in Prague, where he focuses on political geography, geopolitics, and the history of international relations, with a long-standing specialization in Russia and the post-Soviet region. He is a regular contributor to Denik N. It is often compared with the Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch and French empires, but what sets the Russian empire apart? The main difference was that Western powers built overseas empires often described as colonial. By contrast, Russia developed as a territorial or continental power. Russia of course had its colonies, but official narratives point to crimes committed by European imperialists against indigenous peoples in Africa and the Americas, while presenting Russia’s conquests as peaceful settlement and neighbourly help. So the Russian Empire was different in some respects, but in most ways it did not differ to others. When did the Russian state become an empire? The designation of 'Russian Empire' began to be used in 1721, after Peter the Great’s victory over the Swedes in the Great Northern War. But the actual emergence of Russian imperial expansion began much earlier — in the mid-16th century. This was a historical turning point, when the Russian state began shifting towards colonialism. Why then? Before, particularly under Ivan III, the process of so-called gathering of the Rus' lands had been completed. This involved territorial consolidation of the state’s core - similar to other European powers at the time. First, a solid core takes shape, to which further territory is added. In Russia’s case, the core territory was fully consolidated under Ivan III and then Ivan IV the Terrible, when Moscow’s last rival for power — Novgorod — was definitively eliminated. A decisive turning point came in 1552, when Moscow conquered the Kazan Khanate, followed four years later by the Astrakhan Khanate. These khanates were successor states of the Golden Horde — the Mongol-Tatar empire that for centuries had raided the lands of Rus’ controlled territory and subjugated the local principalities. When the Golden Horde fell apart in the 14th century, several independent Tatar states emerged from it: the Khanates of Kazan, Astrakhan, Siberia and Crimea. It was precisely when Moscow began to establish itself offensively in the territories of the former Tatar-Mongol rulers that one can speak of the true birth of the Russian Empire. Moscow as the Third Rome What role did religion, the fall of Constantinople and the idea of Moscow as the Third Rome play in this? Does this not conceal the spiritual root of Russian imperial thinking — that is, the drive for expansion linked to a role as the centre of the Orthodox world? The fall of Constantinople in 1453 shook the entire Christian world, of which the Russian-Muscovite state of the time was also part. Europe and the Christian world as a whole were then asking what would come next. The idea of the Third Rome therefore gradually emerged in Moscow — the notion that, following Constantinople’s fall, Moscow should become the new centre and driving force of Orthodox Christianity. Was Moscow at that time at all prepared to become a major new centre of civilisation? Moscow was not then some vast centre of civilisation. It lay objectively far to the north, and the overwhelming majority of its buildings were wooden. It was also isolated in terms of communication and geography: to the south, there was no longer a Christian Constantinople; to the west were the Poles and Swedes; and to the east lay the Khanate of Kazan. Yet Moscow was able to take advantage of being hidden within this vast space, gradually gathering strength there. Its main advantage was also that, by the time Constantinople fell, the Golden Horde had already disintegrated and was dealing with problems of its own, giving Moscow time to consolidate itself. Was it then the characteristic Russian conviction of 'we must be large because we are surrounded by enemies, and unless we keep pushing out our borders, we will fare badly' emerged? Yes, but to some extent it was born of necessity. Russia was successful in holding its vast territories above all because there was no sufficiently strong competitor anywhere nearby in that particular space - similar to the French and British in North America who also occupied vast territories while displacing or exterminating indigenous populations. Which the Russians did in Siberia, too. Yes. And they found an immensely valuable resource there — furs. There was enormous demand for them in both Europe and China, and furs became Russia’s first stable export commodity to wealthier parts of the world. There is a striking parallel in the fact that the same cold, sparsely populated territory, which initially generated wealth through furs, later proved to be a reservoir of oil and natural gas. Did Russia's technology started lagging behind around that time? Europe was then undergoing a major technological transformation connected with gunpowder and artillery. The Russians obtained much of the necessary know-how from the West. And it was Russia's ability to adopt this technology that contributed to their victories against Kazan and Astrakhan, and in further eastward advances. The conquest of Kazan in 1552. Source: M. V. Petrov-Maslakov, Wikimedia It is also interesting how expansion changes our idea of geographical Europe. Since antiquity, Europe’s eastern border had been associated with the Don River. What role did the Volga River play in this? A crucial one. The Volga, which we now see almost as a symbol of Russianness, was historically not Russian at all for a very long time — it was Tatar. It only became a Russian river in the 1550s after the conquest of Kazan and Astrakhan when Moscow effectively gained control over the river's entire course. Conquest as a holy mission How did Russian expansion fit into the broader global context of the time? Until the 16th century, Europe as a whole had largely been on the defensive globally. It was only with imperial conquest — as Western Europeans pushed across the oceans and Russians over land — that the wheel of world history began to turn in Europe’s favour for the first time. It was only a few decades after the Spanish conquest of Tenochtitlan and Cuzco when Kazan fell in 1552. A difference of 20 or 30 years between these events meant practically nothing at the time. Did these conquests at opposite ends of the world also have similar religious justifications? Yes. Both the Spanish conquistadors in the Americas and Russian conquerors in the east justified their conquests using religion under banners bearing crosses and depictions of saints in the spirit of a holy war. If you placed period portraits of Francisco Pizarro, Hernán Cortés and conqueror of Siberia Yermak Timofeyevich all side by side, you would hardly be able to tell who was conquering Peru, Mexico or Siberia. In each case, you see a bearded European in armour. This shows that Russian expansion was not a distinct anthropological phenomenon, but one form of European imperialism of the time. Did the conquest of the Khanates of Kazan and Astrakhan bring about some change in mentality? All of a sudden different cultures and ethnic groups came under the same roof. I would say so. Ivan the Terrible had a clear cultural, religious and political programme. When Kazan was conquered, the minarets in the Kazan Kremlin were torn down and a mosque was turned into an Orthodox cathedral. This act was explicitly declared as retribution for what the Ottoman Turks had done in Constantinople, where they turned the largest Christian church Hagia Sophia into a mosque. In Kazan, the Russians did this inversely. Ivan the Terrible began ethnic cleansing of the Tatar population and settled Muscovites in occupied territories. With this, Russian language and Orthodoxy began to spread. Under Ivan the Terrible, somewhat of a Messiah complex - a belief that Russian occupation spread good - emerged as a hallmark of Russian imperialism. This element was of course present, and it was primarily expressed in religious terms. The spread of Orthodoxy was seen as a good, and in its name imperial annexation was carried out. It is also interesting to observe how the acquisition of new territories was reflected in the titles of the Russian ruler. We call him the Russian tsar or emperor, but his official title contained a list of each land he ruled. For example, the title of the last tsar, Nicholas II, included King of Poland, Grand Duke of Finland, and Tsar of Kazan, Astrakhan and Siberia. Once you know where these territories are located, you can see directly from the ruler’s title how the empire gradually expanded. In fact, historian Peter Hopkirk calculated that from the conquest of Kazan in 1552 until the outbreak of World War I in 1914, the Russian state grew at an average rate of 110 square km per day. For more than 350 years, Russia thus annexed territory almost the size of present-day Slovakia every year. Size begins to become a curse Did Russia’s vast size ultimately become a curse? Effectively governing such an extensive territory required extensive infrastructure. And this is where the classic Russian paradox emerges: its territory is enormous, but it struggles to govern it properly. That is why the Russian state began hiring experts from abroad, particularly from the West, at a very early stage. But to provide effective public administration, you need, among other things, a population that can read and write — and there were few literate people in Russia.