Insecurity in Nigeria: Lessons from Maritime Sector

Emmanuel Alfred On Friday, July 10, 2026, there was widespread jubilation across Nigeria following the release of pupils and teachers abducted from Oriire Local Government Area of Oyo State after spending 56 days in captivity. This successful rescue operation highlights important considerations not only for the immediate context but also for addressing the broader issue of insecurity in the country. Discussions about insecurity in Nigeria typically focus on familiar strategies such as increasing troop deployments, acquiring weapons, addressing intelligence failures and conducting military operations. However, there is another dimension of Nigeria’s security landscape that deserves our attention: the nation’s maritime domain. Exploring this dimension could offer valuable insights and innovative approaches to enhancing security in Nigeria. For many years, piracy and armed attacks in the Gulf of Guinea posed serious threats to shipping, trade and the wider Nigerian economy. Nigeria’s waters became notorious for kidnapping at sea, attacks on vessels, smuggling operations and the criminal enterprises that profited from these activities. Today, however, the picture is considerably different. Remarkably, the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA) reported no piracy incidents in Nigerian waters in 2025. This achievement is commendable, although it should not be misconstrued as a permanent elimination of the threat. The critical question to consider is not whether Nigeria has totally “won’’ the battle against maritime insecurity, but rather what strategies were employed at sea that could inform approaches to addressing insecurity on land. The answer may lie less in the sheer number of security personnel deployed and more in the organisational structure of the security system itself. Intelligence before force One of the clearest lessons from maritime experience is the importance of understanding a threat before determining how best to respond. Nigeria invested significantly in enhancing maritime domain awareness, surveillance and intelligence capabilities, including the C4i Centre associated with the Deep Blue Project. Rather than simply deploying more security personnel at sea, Nigeria has focused on improving its capacity to see, track and understand activities across its maritime space. This distinction is crucial; effective security encompasses not only swift responses to attacks but also understanding the networks underpinning criminal activities, including individuals involved, their operational areas, movement patterns, sponsors and where their proceeds go. Kidnapping, banditry, armed robbery and other forms of organised crime on land operate in much the same way. They often involve financiers, informants, transporters, safe houses, weapons suppliers and escape route planners. If criminals operate as networks while security forces respond mainly to individual incidents, the state will remain largely reactive. Lesson from Nigeria’s maritime experience suggests a more proactive approach: build intelligence systems capable of identifying and disrupting criminal networks, rather than simply reacting to their latest attacks. Security gaps, often institutional gaps The challenges posed by criminal networks often reflect institutional gaps within security frameworks. Criminal networks do not respect administrative boundaries. At sea, criminal networks can operate across territorial waters and jurisdictions, which requires Nigeria to collaborate with neighbouring countries and regional institutions. Likewise, criminal groups do not cease operating simply because they cross into another state. Yet, Nigeria’s security architecture remains heavily influenced by administrative boundaries and institutional jurisdictions. The point here is not solely whether each security agency is sufficiently staffed or equipped, but whether they effectively share intelligence, coordinate operations and together pursue criminal networks across jurisdictions. Experiences from Nigeria’s maritime context highlight a crucial principle: security institutions should be designed around the behaviour and dynamics of threats, rather than being confined to the limitations of government agency boundaries. When threats are interconnected, but institutions operate in isolation, security gaps inevitably emerge. Make crime difficult and less profitable Effective security measures cannot depend on force alone. While arresting criminals is important, there must also be a credible prospect of prosecution and punishment to deter future offences. Piracy is ultimately an economic enterprise, driven by the perception that the rewards appear to outweigh the risks. As part of its maritime response, Nigeria has implemented not only surveillance and security operations but also a stronger legal framework. The Suppression of Piracy and Other Maritime Offences Act 2019 significantly strengthened the prosecution of maritime crimes, and subsequent judicial enforcement has demonstrated that maritime offences can attract serious legal consequences. Insecurity has intersected with poverty, unemployment, environmental degradation, weak institutions and limited economic opportunities. While these factors may create conditions in which criminality thrives, they do not justify or excuse it. The state must simultaneously address underlying vulnerabilities and increase the risks and consequences associated with crime. Prioritisation and effective coordination Perhaps the most valuable lesson gleaned from the maritime sector is not any single piece of equipment, law or security operation. It is prioritisation and effective coordination. Complex security problems rarely have single-agency solutions. Nigeria’s maritime security architecture brings together surveillance, intelligence, naval and other security operations, maritime regulation, legal enforcement and regional cooperation. The existence of multiple security agencies with considerable capabilities underscores the significance of connecting these resources toward a common security objective. Although Nigeria has soldiers, police officers, intelligence personnel, surveillance technologies, and laws, the effectiveness of these resources can diminish if information sharing between institutions is slow, responsibilities overlap, or agencies pursue disconnected objectives. Therefore, Nigeria’s security problem may sometimes stem from a lack of integrated security systems, rather than a shortage of personnel or agencies. The maritime experience demonstrates that a well-structured institutional framework is as critical as having adequate manpower and equipment. Suppression not permanent victory There is, however, a danger in drawing overly optimistic conclusions from the maritime experience. A noted decline in piracy does not mean that the conditions facilitating such crimes have been eliminated. Criminal groups adapt, change routes, evolve tactics, and explore new opportunities. The same is true on land. Security gains can be reversed if institutions become complacent, funding declines, intelligence systems deteriorate or underlying economic and governance problems are ignored. The objective should therefore not simply be to reduce attacks temporarily, but to build institutions capable of detecting emerging threats, adapting to changing tactics and maintaining sustained pressure on criminal networks. Achieving this level of sustainable security is a challenge, but it is essential for long-term stability and safety. Why It Matters The issue of insecurity in Nigeria extends beyond immediate safety concerns and has significant socio-economic implications for every citizen. When farmers encounter dangers in accessing their farms, agricultural production suffers, leading to food shortages and rising prices. When transport routes become dangerous, logistics costs increase, impacting businesses and consumers alike. When businesses spend more on private security and insurance to mitigate risks, productive capital is diverted from growth and expansion initiatives. When investors perceive the country as unsafe, investment decisions change. When citizens are unable to move freely or conduct business safely and confidently, the very foundation of the economy is jeopardised. This is why the maritime experience matters even to citizens who may never set foot on a commercial vessel. While piracy and land-based banditry are not identical threats, experiences in combating maritime insecurity reveal that complex security challenges can be significantly reduced when the government integrates intelligence, specialised capabilities, legal instruments, institutional coordination and sustained attention. The Oyo rescue operation appears to have employed some of the very principles this article advocates: intelligence, multi-agency collaboration, specialised capabilities and sustained targeting of a criminal network. Therefore, the more important question is whether Nigeria can adapt proven maritime security strategies to address the security challenges faced on land. Can Nigeria transform exceptional multi-agency successes into a routine, institutionalised national security framework? Rather than relying on new slogans, there is an urgent need for an honest, systematic evaluation of successful security measures and exploration of how these lessons can be applied to different contexts. By harnessing successful approaches from its maritime sector, Nigeria has the potential to significantly make its roads, farms, schools, communities and cities safer. Ultimately, security is not a one-time event, but a dynamic system. Sustainable security depends on designing a robust framework, capable of learning, adapting and enduring over time, ensuring safety for all citizens. Dr. Emmanuel Alfred, a Maritime Affairs Analyst wrote from Lagos