I led Israel’s oldest peace group and advised the Knesset. Netanyahu may fall on Tuesday, but the West Bank annexation policies won’t

Israel’s election on Tuesday (27 October) could bring a new government without changing the country’s course. Having worked as a parliamentary adviser in the Knesset and later as executive director of Peace Now, I know how that can happen. Many of the parties seeking to replace Benjamin Netanyahu are avoiding clear positions on the Israeli-Palestinian question, but some of their candidates may end up overseeing annexation they never campaigned for. Israel’s previous coalition, led by Naftali Bennett in 2021, offers a warning. Called the “government of change” because it ended Netanyahu’s 12-year run in office, it brought together a variety of parties, from Bennett’s rightwing party to Labor and Meretz, leftwing parties. Its answer to profound ideological disagreements, particularly over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, was to preserve the status quo. The coalition lasted roughly 18 months, and although it changed the tone of government, it left much of the policy towards the West Bank intact. For example, Merav Michaeli, then Labor leader and transport minister, opposed settlement expansion. Yet her ministry continued to implement previously approved infrastructure commitments, including substantial budgets for roads facilitating that expansion. Through my work at Peace Now, I saw how the coalition’s status-quo agreement constrained her ability to challenge projects inherited from the previous government. A minister could thus find herself implementing a vision she opposed. Today, the stakes are higher. Another slice of the West Bank Consider E1, between Jerusalem and the settlement of Ma'ale Adumim, where construction would threaten Palestinian territorial contiguity and the viability of a future Palestinian state. The government has advanced tenders for all 3,401 planned housing units, with crucial stages of the tender process set to be completed before a new government takes office. E1 exemplifies wider efforts to establish difficult-to-reverse facts: new settlement outposts, including in areas under Palestinian civil administration, expanding settlements and administrative changes that entrench Israeli control. A successor government would have to intervene actively to reverse them. These developments are backed by an explicit political vision. The current government's guidelines and coalition agreements assert exclusive Jewish rights throughout the land of Israel and commit to advancing Israeli sovereignty in the West Bank. Under Bezalel Smotrich, serving as a minister within the defence ministry, a new settlement administration and civilian positions have been established, shifting significant aspects of West Bank governance from military administration to civilian political control. These structures will not disappear when their architects leave office. The far-right has equipped the state with both a vision and the machinery to advance it. Inertia is not neutral when the machinery is already moving in one direction. Parties seeking to replace Netanyahu need not necessarily agree on a final-status agreement with the Palestinians, but they must find enough common ground to commit to halting annexation and reversing the structures that enable it. Those understandings belong in coalition negotiations, when parties still have leverage, rather than in battles left for individual ministers once they are in office. Nor is this a distant constitutional question. Palestinians in the West Bank already face systematic violations of their basic rights and freedoms, from restrictions on movement and access to land to violence and forced displacement. Each new settlement and outpost deepens this injustice and makes the prospect of a political settlement more remote. Facts on ground The entrenchment of permanent Israeli control is creating a reality that is increasingly difficult to reverse, making political intervention more urgent with every passing year. The current government's response to growing international pressure illustrates the danger. After the UK announced measures targeting settlements, foreign minister Gideon Sa'ar ordered the closure of its consulate in East Jerusalem. Britain considered expelling Israeli diplomats in response, and a compromise left a much smaller British mission operating. The episode illustrates Netanyahu's vision of a 'Super Sparta': an Israel preparing itself for international isolation rather than addressing the policies contributing to it. A future government seeking to change that trajectory should start with two tasks. 'Messianic minority' First, it must take seriously the reasons behind international sanctions and address the policies driving them, including settlement expansion and settler violence. A messianic minority must not be allowed to drag Israel into international isolation and economic decline. Second, the government should help European partners distinguish between Israel and the settlements, including through transparent supply chains and clear proof of origin, so that restrictions aimed at settlements do not spill over into the broader Israeli economy. Both tasks require urgent and concrete policy changes, beyond a more moderate diplomatic tone. European governments should not expect a new coalition, or even international sanctions themselves, to bring about these changes automatically. They need to make their expectations explicit, press prospective coalition partners to incorporate concrete commitments into their agreements, and judge the resulting government by its actions. Without that pressure, politicians who never endorsed annexation may become useful idiots for a project they do not support, helping to consolidate a single undemocratic state in which millions of Palestinians are permanently denied equal rights and freedoms. Preventing that outcome requires urgent political action, while a different future is still possible. Neither Israelis seeking change nor their European partners can afford to assume it will happen on its own.