Delta CEO Ed Bastian says flying from Atlanta to LaGuardia takes longer today than when Delta launched the route in the 1950s. Except Delta didn’t fly to LaGuardia in the 1950s. Delta’s New York service began at Newark. It took another 13 years to start LaGuardia. And the distinction between serving New York and serving the airport a New Yorker actually wants has been costing airlines money ever since. Speaking with Fortune, Bastian said: Today it takes more time to fly from Atlanta to LaGuardia than it did in the 1950s when we first launched that flight, which is absurd. Delta’s history gives its LaGuardia launch date as October 1, 1969. Northeast and Northwest Airlines, which Delta later absorbed, served LaGuardia in 1945. But there was no Delta Atlanta–LaGuardia service in the 1950s. The airline that became such a powerful force in New York was a late arrival, built through acquisitions, deals with competitors, and an understanding of what New Yorkers would put in their wallets. The Mayor Who Refused To Get Off His Plane In New Jersey On November 24, 1934, New York Mayor Fiorello La Guardia arrived from Chicago on TWA. The plane landed at Newark. The mayor refused to get off. His ticket said New York. This was New Jersey. After an argument, the aircraft took him onward to Floyd Bennett Field in Brooklyn. He told the New York Times, “my ticket says New York and that’s where they brought me.” He repeated the stunt the following month. He wasn’t demanding to be taken to what’s now New York LaGuardia. That airport wouldn’t open until 1939. He was promoting New York City’s existing airport in Brooklyn, trying to pull airline business across the state line. Ironically, Floyd Bennett Field was about the same distance from Times Square as Newark. Delta’s First New York Flights Landed At Newark Delta didn’t grow up as a New York airline. Its roots were in Southern crop dusting, and its headquarters moved to Atlanta in 1941. Eastern had a substantial head start in the New York–Atlanta market. Back then an airline couldn’t just decide to add a route. The federal government’s Civil Aeronautics Board decided who could fly where. Delta’s 1956 annual report says its new route award allowed three daily round trips between New York and Newark. The launch timetable shows flight 724 leaving Atlanta at 6:05 p.m. and arriving at Newark at 9:21 p.m., with a Washington stop. That’s 3 hours 16 minutes. Comparing that one-stop propeller service with today’s nonstop wouldn’t tell us much about air traffic control in any case… Delta was already selling New York from Manhattan ticket offices, including Rockefeller Plaza. It added Idlewild, today’s JFK, on May 15, 1957. The airline’s August 1957 timetable shows Delta’s four-engine Flying Scot daytime coach flights using Idlewild, while its other flights used Newark. Why Did LaGuardia Take Until 1969? Delta had arrived late in a regulated market, and LaGuardia was difficult to get into. Eastern and American each essentially had a concourse to themselves, while the other airlines shared the remaining two. Delta initially served the airport with relatively small DC-9s, while Eastern already had 727s. Delta began advertising LaGuardia in its August 1969 timetable, Flight 620 will begin operating upon completion of arrangements for terminal facilities at LaGuardia. The actual October 1969 launch schedule offered non-stop service, not available from Delta’s 1950s service. Flight Leaves Atlanta Arrives LaGuardia Scheduled time 168 6:15 a.m. 8:15 a.m. 2 hours 620 12:10 p.m. 2:08 p.m. 1 hour 58 minutes 622 6:15 p.m. 8:13 p.m. 1 hour 58 minutes The 1956 annual report advertised a future Atlanta–New York time of 1 hour 41 minutes aboard forthcoming DC-8 jets, which Delta hadn’t introduced yet. How Delta Bought Its Way Into Being A New York Airline A Civil Aeronautics Board examiner recommended giving Delta New York–Miami authority in 1956, but the board itself rejected that awarding the service to Northeast. Sixteen years later, Delta bought Northeast. That 1972 acquisition brought a much stronger position in New York, Boston and Florida. In 1991, Delta acquired Pan Am’s transatlantic operation and its Northeast shuttle. Then came the deal that changed the scale of LaGuardia. Proposed in 2009 and completed in 2011, the US Airways slot swap gave Delta 132 daily LaGuardia slot pairs. US Airways received 42 daily Washington National pairs, $66.5 million, and rights for additional São Paulo service. The Government Accountability Office measured Delta’s LaGuardia slot share rising from 24% in April 2011 to 44% in May 2012. Regulators required slots to go to smaller competitors as a condition of approval. At LaGuardia, JetBlue received eight daily pairs and WestJet another eight. JetBlue actually bid the most for both packages, but the auction rules wouldn’t let one airline win both. Then, as I reported in 2024, following Enilria’s examination of slot trades, Delta even managed to get back the eight round trips WestJet had received as a competition remedy. Slots handed to a rival to keep Delta’s expansion competitive wound up back with Delta. US Airways helped Delta grow at LaGuardia. United would help at JFK. When United pulled out in 2015, Delta took over its JFK slots under a long-term lease. Delta also spent money leveraging that access with its $4 billion LaGuardia terminal project. United Tried To Prove Newark Was New York Using Taxi Ads Newark is a New York metropolitan airport. Depending on where you’re going and the traffic, it can be the most convenient one. It also serves a large and wealthy New Jersey market in its own right. United’s digital taxi top campaign showed real-time driving estimates to Newark and JFK. The advertising industry’s account reveals the best detail: when Newark wasn’t the quickest, the display switched to generic United branding. The comparison disappeared when United lost it. When United left JFK in 2015, that meant premium Los Angeles and San Francisco service to Newark. After Scott Kirby joined United, he called the decision a mistake. The airline had looked at the money its JFK flights made or lost. Kirby explained that leaving also helped American win corporate accounts such as Disney and Time Warner. Those customers bought travel beyond Los Angeles–New York, including Los Angeles–London. United returned to JFK in 2021, then left again in 2022 after failing to obtain the access it wanted to build a larger operation. Its Blue Sky partnership with JetBlue provides another way back: access for up to seven daily United round trips from JFK’s new Terminal 6 as early as 2027, alongside reciprocal loyalty benefits and the ability to sell each other’s flights. Winning New York Also Means Winning Credit Card Spending I’ve made the same argument about American’s retreat in major markets. An airline needs to be useful where high-spending customers live. Otherwise why would those customers choose its credit card? A New Yorker who wants LaGuardia for domestic trips and JFK for longer journeys is a candidate for a Delta Amex (even though those miles are worth less than competing currencies). Delta’s investor presentation connects large coastal metropolitan economies with its premium and loyalty growth. In 2023 Delta described its cobrand spending as approaching 1% of U.S. GDP. Using American Express’s disclosures for that year—Delta represented about 10% of $1.680 trillion in worldwide network volume—implies roughly $168 billion. Against the contemporary $27.36 trillion estimate of U.S. GDP, that’s about 0.61%. As I’ve argued, they’re rounding generously. And there’s a bigger problem with the growth story. When Delta renewed its American Express deal in 2019, it projected $7 billion annually by 2023. It delivered $6.8 billion. That sounds like nearly hitting the target, until you account for how much pandemic-era inflation had shrunk the value of each dollar – in a way that hadn’t been anticipated in 2019. Consumer prices rose about 19% between 2019 and 2023. Using annual consumer price indexes, the $6.8 billion payment had only about $5.7 billion of 2019 purchasing power. Delta nearly hit its 2019 goals in nominal terms due to inflation, but its actual performance was a real miss. Delta now expects more than $9 billion from American Express in 2026. It’s an enormous business, but it’s had a ceiling greater than what Delta had hoped in 2019 – which also explains the importance of free wifi, Uber and Starbucks – looking for new customers anywhere they can find them. The poor return on spending of a Delta credit card finally matters. Ultimately, though, Delta wasn’t born a New York airline. Ed Bastian’s predecessors assembled one, including airport access its competitors willingly gave up. United is still working to repair its decision to leave JFK. For customers who insist that their New York ticket take them to a particular New York airport, being told Newark is close enough still doesn’t close the sale. And Bastian’s 1950s comparison is typical Bastian – never let facts like connecting service and which airport the airline served get in the way of the story he wants to tell. Topics on this page
Delta’s CEO Says It Flew To LaGuardia In The 1950s—It Didn’t, But His Predecessors Figured Out How To Win New York
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