Current Developments in the AES Countries: Redefining Nigeria’s Foreign Policy as a Desideratum

Bola A. Akinterinwa The pattern of development efforts and foreign policy attitude in the Alliance des États du Sahel (Alliance of Sahel States), generally abbreviated to AES or ASS for analytical ease, points to consolidation of self-reliance strategy and preparedness to accept whatever mistakes made in the consolidation of such strategy and regardless of whatever external adversary sopinion. Put differently, the AES countries, comprising the Republic of Mali, Republic of Burkina Faso, and Republic of Niger, which was established in protest against the ECOWAS policy of zero tolerance for unconstitutional change of government in Africa, and particularly in West Africa, have determinedly decided to grow and develop their countries on the sole basis of self-reliance, respect-driven interdependence, and reliance on what they have to get what they need in international relations as foreign policy tactic. The response of the ECOWAS from which the AES countries broke away has regretted the mismanagement of the implementation of its policy and now wants the AES countries to come back. Nigeria, in particular, has been providing leadership in this regard, but the commitment of their return is still difficult to secure. Hence, it is still difficult to ascertain whether it is useful or not useful for the AES countries to return to the ECOWAS. In other words, will regional integration be better fast-tracked with their return or with the continued sustenance of the AES? Nigeria has sent delegations to the AES leaders to discuss oneness of purpose and togetherness in action within the framework of one ECOWAS. It is against this background that the discussion of what foreign policy attitude should be adopted towards the AES in light of the current developments in the AES countries is raised, particularly following the public presentation and launching of Beyond 65 Years of Independence: Nigeria’s Foreign Policy in a Changing Global Arena. Festschrift in Honour of Professor Bola A. Akinterinwa, on Thursday, 12th November, 2026 at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs. The book was edited by Professors Usman A. Tar and Sharkdam Wapmuk, Associate Research Professor Joshua O. Bolarinwa, and Dr. Omotola A. Ilesanmi, Senior Research Fellow. What is the best way forward in a changing global arena and in the context of developments in the AES countries after 65 years of independence? Current Developments in the AES Countries September 2026 marked four years of Captain Ibrahim Traoré in power, in spite of the many coups d’état organized to unseat and destabilize him. Captain Traoré came to power on 30 September, 2022 and planned to return power to the civilian administration but he had to review his agenda by extending by five years with effect from July 2024 his planned elections. His argument was that democratic elections could not work in Burkina Faso until the restoration of security. Even though the international proponents of human rights alleged heavy restrictions on free speech and suspension, if not dissolution, of more than 100 non-governmental organisations and civil society groups, the military junta is on record to have succeeded in gradually growing and developing the country. At the level of the quest for economic self-sufficiency, which is at the centerpiece of governance, Captain Traoré inaugurated the Rafino BF, the first national gold refinery, which is required to refine more than 164 tons of gold annually. The government raised its share in new mining projects from 10% to 15% while contemplating the nationalization of some key mining and economic assets. And true enough, economic growth rate increased from 4.8% in 2024 to 5.3% in 2025 and projected to increase further to 6.1% in 2026. The mere fact that cereal production reached 7.2 million tons in 2025, representing more than 126% of national needs, lends much credence to the efforts of government at the level of agricultural output and food security. The industrial sector contributed about 32.9% to the GDP, increasing from its previous level of 24%, while gold production attained 94 tonnes in 2025. More notably, Captain Traoré has put in place a revised national development plan, called RELANCE 2026-2030. Within the framework of this development agenda, the Air Burkina has been revitalized and so has the Bobo-Dioulasso University Hospital. Tomato processing facilities and local textile plants and many other domestic development projects have been launched. The size of the national army has doubled apart from the tens of thousands of civilian Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland (VDP). And perhaps more interestingly, Burkina Faso, under Captain Traoré, has been playing host to voluntary donations that have reached $850 million. Additionally, Burkina Faso has also started biometric enrollment for unique digital ID for all Burkinabé nationals. With the gradual efforts at national cohesion and development, can it be expected that the Burkinabé will be prepared for another retour en arrière (going backward)? The current efforts at economic growth and development are believed to have been made possible as a result of the absence of French mainmise in the country. Put differently, the issue at the level of foreign policy challenges is that France remains perceptibly an obstacle in the progress of Burkina Faso. Besides, Nigeria has a sort of an entente cordiale with France, but Nigeria is still perceived rightly or wrongly as a stooge of France, a perception that makes Nigeria not quite trustworthy in the eyes of the AES countries. In Mali, and like in Burkina Faso, armed insurgent groups continuously challenge the authority of the military junta. While the al-Qaeda-linked JNIM (Jamaa’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin) is disrupting the transport routes, the Islamic State Sahel Province is attacking civilians, a development that prompted in October 2026 the returning of Malian troops to Kidal following the withdrawal of the separatist forces from the town. While the military government of Assimi Koïta is making all efforts to consolidate its hold on power, the unending insurgency and jihadist violence has always made political governance in the country very insecure. In fact Mali’s strategic partnership with Russia is yet to help abate the problem of insecurity. The cooperation between the JNIM and the FLA (Azawad Liberation Front, the Tuareg-led separatist movement, still remains a major challenge. To strengthen the assault on the insurgents, Mali has been deepening its security and economic partnerships with Turkiye. Mali and Turkiye have hosted military and defence exhibitions, the Bamako Expo Fair. What is noteworthy here is that, while Russia continues to provide military personnel, equipment and operational assistance, the militant organisations have continued to launch severe attacks on government forces and Russian personnel have also suffered casualties. The 18 October 2026 armed attack on civilian camps around Ménaka in northeastern Mali generated condemnation. However, all these attacks have not prevented the deepening efforts at economic transformation. The Malian mining sector is quite active, accounting for 9.5% of GDP, 40.9% of state revenue and about 79% of total exports. GDP growth was 5.6% in 2025 while the projected rate for 2026 is 6.0%. Gold and lithium still make Mali the centre of attraction in international economic relations and this is noteworthy. More notably, France is similarly held responsible for the insecurity in Mali. The declaration of the French as unwanted and the shift of alliance from France to Russia do not appear to be a solution-providing acts. In fact, the nature of Russian understanding with Africa does not also look promising. For example, from the perspective of the Russo-African summit, it is difficult to argue any increasing African interest in strengthening alliance with Russia. 43 African leaders attended the first Russia-Africa Summit in 2019 in Sochi, Russia. At the 2023 St. Petersburg summit, there were only 17 Heads of State. Could the sharp decline from 43 to 17 be explained simply by Russian Special Military Intervention in Ukraine? The 2026 summit is expected to be more encouraging as delegations from 48 countries, including 22 Heads of States, are scheduled to attend. Can the expectation be taken as a manifestation of growing reliance on Russia and strengthening of ties between Africa and Russia? As observed by a Dakar-based analyst, Beverly Ochieng, ‘the economic incentives to go for the Russia summit are much more limited.’ If the incentives are limited, how do we then explain the Russian pulling factors or the African pushing factors to want to attend the summit? Whatever is the case, developments in the AES cannot be said to be assisting good governance and enhancement of peace and security in the ECOWAS region and Sahel sub-region. In the Republic of Niger, the situation of insecurity is the same. Political governance is quite fragile. In August 2026, there was a failed 24-hour coup against the military government of General Abdourahmane Tiani. The Russian partners helped to quell the mutiny in Niamey. With the deepening insecurity, Algeria deployed fighter jets to help protect the northern energy facilities near the Libyan border. Like in Mali and Burkina Faso, France is held responsible for problems in Niger and France has always denied any involvement, in spite of evidences of French involvement through deployment of drones in the social media. Like Mali and Burkina Faso did in June 2026, Niger has also withdrawn from the International Court of Justice. Niger also withdrew from the 1994 Nigeria-initiated Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in 2025 following the establishment of the AES. Like in Burkina Faso, economic growth and development is steady in Niger. The World Bank has it that more than one million people had electricity access between January and October 2026, thanks to the Haské (Niger Accelerating Electricity Access) project. What is also noteworthy at this juncture is the new initiative of Nigeria to exchange ideas with the three AES countries on the need for military cooperation to contain terrorism in the region and sub-region, in light of the strong belief that terror has no boundary, it does not know boundary and therefore does not operate on the basis of boundaries. Redefining Nigeria’s Foreign Policy as a Desideratum As explained on 9 November, 2026 by the Firstpost, the spokesperson of the Nigerian Defence Headquarters, Major General Samaila Uba, has it that Nigeria is holding security consultations with all the AES member states on the need to restore regional stability and security. As he put it, ‘we also examined the diplomatic alternatives and options available to address issues arising from the withdrawal of those countries from ECOWAS. I assure you that we will begin to see the dividends of that high-level engagement very soon.’ In the same vein, Nigeria’s Defence Minister, General Christopher Musa, explained the necessity to ensure the containment of exportation of terror from the Sahel sub-region to Nigeria. Rebuilding military cooperation and repositioning the Multinational Joint Task Force has become an urgent need. In his words, ‘we are trying to stop them (terrorists, boko haramists, etc.) from getting deep into the South…because of the terrain…’ And true, if terrorists are, for whatever reasons, enabled to get to the south, insecurity will be more difficult to control. Apart from this, the Defence Minister made it clear that efforts were being taken to also prevent Nigeria from being taken unawares. He said Government is opening other new military fronts along Benin-Niger border with Nigeria. This cannot but be one good approach to the redefinition of not just Nigeria’s foreign policy but also that of Africa of the future as being investigated by Professor Tunde Adeniran. In redefining Nigeria’s foreign policy, especially in the context of Francophone West Africa, and particularly as the AES is most concerned, the militating issues must first be identified and addressed. This cannot but begin with the understanding of Nigeria’s foreign policy. In his foreword to the Festschrift in honour of Professor Bola A. Akinterinwa, Professor Akinwande Bolaji Akinyemi noted that Nigeria’s foreign policy since independence has been quite ambitious and complex, but that Nigeria’s achievements ‘have unfolded alongside continuing challenges, including domestic instability, economic pressures, and the uncertainties of a changing world order. Consequently, he posited further, ‘to understand Nigeria’s foreign policy is to examine the interaction between aspiration and reality, between principle and pragmatism.’ In other words, what is Nigeria’s aspiration and what is the situational reality of the environment of the aspiration? In Chapter 2 of the Festschrift, entitled “Sixty Years of Nigeria’s International Relations: Challenges and Accomplishments,” and authored by a diplomatist, Professor Alaba Ogunsanwo, Francophonie is a major problem he identified and this cannot be ordinarily handled. Professor Ogunsanwo drew attention to two cases of the problem of Francophonie for further reflections. First was when the ECOWAS decided in June 2019 to launch its ‘long-awaited regional currency –the Eco- in 2020. The intention was to merge the Francophone CFA with ‘the one that Nigeria, Ghana, Liberia, Sierra Leone and The Gambia had been working on since 2004, under the then Obasanjo administration.’ Most unfortunately, however, ‘in early December 2019 Nigeria’s Minister of Finance expressed some doubt on the feasibility of actually launching the new regional currency by 2020.’ Later in December 2019, the French President, Emmanuel Macron, came on a visit to the Côte d’Ivoire and ‘announced with his host President, Alassane Dramane Ouattara, the joint decision to have the CFA of the eight countries converted to the Eco in 2020 with linkage to the Euro, but no longer requiring deposit of 50% of reserves of the countries concerned with the French Treasury.’ Professor Ogunsanwo asked how Nigeria would be able to handle the implications of this question as from January of 2020. Additionally, and perhaps more disturbingly, Professor Ogunsanwo has it that ‘French President, François Hollande, in January 2013, militarily intervened in Northern Mali to carry out a policy ECOWAS had decided upon and received approval from the Security Council of the United Nations to implement. Nigeria ended up being kept out of the operation even though Chad a non-ECOWAS country, sent in 2,000 troops.’ Put differently, the ECOWAS has adopted a name for its currency, ECO, but France and the Côte d’Ivoire gave the ECO a Franco-European dimension and thus completely removing the ECOWAS originality being given by the five Anglophone Member States of the ECOWAS from it. How should this factor of French speakingness be addressed, particularly in the context of the AES which is distancing itself from France? How does the bilateral entente between President Bola Ahmed Tinubu and President Emmanuel Macron speak to Nigeria-AES relationship? Can the relationship be made to impact on the return of the AES to the ECOWAS? And more disturbingly, how do we explain the fact that Nigeria has UN Security Council approval to seek resolution of the crisis in Northern Mali and President Holland had to also militarily intervene at the same time? Professor Ogunsanwo probably did not see any serious problem with this: he suggested that ‘Nigeria has two options one of which is to stay out completely and become isolated in a region in which its market share of import is over 60%. Were this to happen, nothing would stop the majority of ECOWAS countries asking Morocco to actualize the Monrovia decision of 2017 admitting that country to the regional body.’ Professor Hassan Saliu explains in his chapter 3 why Nigeria’s foreign policy is digging below its weight. Some of the factors responsible for this development include ‘the poor state of the economy, obscurity of foreign policy in the scheme of things in the country, lack of coordination, feeling of self-importance, declining capacity of Foreign Service Officers, and unclear foreign policy objectives…’ Any effort at redefining Nigeria’s foreign policy cannot but reckon with these challenges. Reflecting on over 60 years of independentist foreign policy of Nigeria in Chapter 4, Professor Williams Alade Fawole has asked: ‘to what extent can one say that those highly romantic pre-independence conceptions of Nigeria’s destined place and messianic role in Africa and the rest of the Black world have been pursued and realized?’ One observation Professor Fawole attempted was that ‘contemporary Nigerian foreign policy in the last decade or so has however come under severe criticism for lacking the usual and even upstaged dynamism the country had been known for. In Africa especially, Nigeria has been accused of punching below its weight, allowing smaller countries to ride roughshod over it and even upstage it in areas where it is expected to demonstrate leadership.’ From the perspective of Olayinka Sodiq Kazeem in Chapter 12 of the Festschrift, which is on “Nigeria’s Role in International Organisations,” for Nigeria to assert its role in international organisations, emphasis should be on improving good governance, controlling corruption, increasing access to quality education, food and health security among its populace and of course infrastructural development…’ Grosso modo, the current developments in the AES countries have largely been strengthening sub-regional integration in the way the 1991 Abuja Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community conceived it. In order to fast track continental integration, African leaders rejected the UN definition of Africa as a region of the world and said Africa, since 1991, is a continent of five regions: West, North, Central, East, and Southern. This is as provided in Article 1(d) of the Treaty. Article 1(e) says a sub-region can be carved out of any of the five regions when two or three countries from one region or more than one region choose to come together as such. The AES is therefore a sub-region of West Africa region par excellence. It is quite legitimate. It is not illegal. It is a resultant of political sovereignty and in the interest of African integration. Consequently, in redefining Nigeria’s foreign policy, this factor cannot but be a desideratum. Nigeria’s foreign policy should not encourage the abolishment of the AES or insisting on the return of AES as individual members, but as a sub-regional group member. The AES can be given a special observer status at the level of the ECOWAS. At the level of individual Nigeria, the foreign policy attitude of Nigeria should be more of bilateralism when relating with the Francophones rather than on the basis of a multilateral approach. This cannot but be so because France’s main policy towards Nigeria is to prevent Nigeria from being able to influence the Francophone neighbours against French interests in Africa. Nigeria’s reactive policy towards France is not different: prevent France from undermining Nigeria’s interests in Francophone Africa. This situational reality should be the main definiens in defining Nigeria’s foreign policy.