5 Things To Know About China’s Coercion Campaign Against Taiwan and the Limits of Leader-Level Diplomacy

President Donald Trump emerged from his May 2026 summit with Chinese leader Xi Jinping embracing a new framework for U.S.-China relations. The White House said the two leaders agreed to build a “constructive relationship of strategic stability” based on “fairness and reciprocity,” even as competition continues over trade, technology, and security. Taiwan is emerging as a test case for this framework. Asked after the summit about a pending $14 billion arms package for Taipei, Trump stated he was holding it “in abeyance” because “it depends on China,” calling the weapons a “very good negotiating chip.” The package remains under review: Secretary of State Marco Rubio told Congress in June it was still being reviewed, while Acting Navy Secretary Hung Cao said Taiwan arms sales had been put on “pause” amid U.S. munitions demands from the Iran war. Beijing, however, has shown little sign of easing its pressure on Taiwan. A review of daily Chinese air and maritime activity around the island shows that military operations remain persistent. Since the May summit, China has continued military drills around Taiwan while sharpening its warnings to Washington. In July, Foreign Minister Wang Yi urged Rubio to handle Taiwan “with the utmost caution.” The Chinese Communist Party-controlled Global Times went further, advocating for increased military drills around Taiwan and reaffirming there is “absolutely no space for compromise” over Taiwan’s fate. These actions and statements suggest Beijing is holding out the prospect of greater stability with Washington while continuing to apply coercive pressure around Taiwan. Here’s what to know: 1. U.S.-China summit diplomacy has not eased China’s pressure on Taiwan. Leader-level engagement between Trump and Xi has yet to produce a sustained reduction in Chinese military pressure around Taiwan. A review of daily activity since Trump returned to office shows that People’s Liberation Army (PLA) aircraft and maritime operations remain a near-constant presence around the island. The tempo has fluctuated around major diplomatic events, including periods of somewhat lower air activity, but the broader pattern has held. PLA crossings of the median-line in the Taiwan Strait, once treated as unusually provocative, have become routine. Beijing has therefore changed the operational baseline around Taiwan even as Washington and Beijing have pursued trade agreements, summit diplomacy, and what the Trump administration describes as “strategic stability” in the bilateral relationship. Recent developments reinforce that disconnect. In early June, China expanded Coast Guard patrols to waters east of Taiwan, an area where such operations had previously been unusual, and continued using military and paramilitary forces to assert jurisdiction around the island. After meeting Wang in Manila in July, Rubio said Washington viewed those Coast Guard deployments as contrary to the “strategic stability” the two sides were working toward. The distinction matters. Diplomacy may influence the timing or intensity of individual Chinese operations, but the available data show little evidence that leader-level engagement has altered Beijing’s underlying coercive posture toward Taiwan. 2. China separates trade cooperation from its military posture against Taiwan. China has shown little inclination to treat progress in U.S.-China economic relations as requiring restraint around Taiwan. Trump and Xi’s October 2025 meeting in the South Korean city of Busan produced a limited trade truce: Washington reduced some tariffs, while Beijing agreed to suspend new rare-earth export controls, resume major agricultural purchases, and pause several retaliatory measures. Yet the subsequent easing of trade tensions produced no comparable change in Beijing’s approach to Taiwan. FDD’s tracker shows that Chinese air activity dipped during portions of the post-Busan period, but the lull was neither broad nor sustained. Median-line crossings remained routine, while Chinese naval and other maritime activity around the island continued. Two months later, Beijing launched Justice Mission-2025, a major exercise around Taiwan that underscored how readily China can separate economic diplomacy from military coercion. The drills came even as the Busan trade framework remained intact. More broadly, the tracker shows no corresponding reset in Beijing’s coercive baseline after the trade truce. The pattern suggests that China treats pressure on Taiwan as a standing instrument of statecraft rather than a variable that rises and falls with the broader tone of U.S.-China relations. Trade truces can reduce friction in one part of the relationship without producing meaningful restraint in the Taiwan Strait. 3. China reacts more forcefully to moves that strengthen Taiwan than to broader U.S.-China friction. Beijing appears especially sensitive to steps that strengthen Taiwan’s ability to defend itself. On December 17, 2025, the Trump administration approved an $11.1 billion weapons package for Taiwan. China immediately demanded that Washington cancel the sale and warned it would take “forceful measures” in response. Eleven days later, the PLA launched Justice Mission-2025. The drills encircled Taiwan, included live-fire operations and simulated strikes, rehearsed a blockade of major ports, and for the first time explicitly emphasized deterring outside military intervention during a future contingency. That sequence does not establish that U.S. arms sales are themselves destabilizing. It shows how Beijing uses military pressure to raise the perceived costs of strengthening Taiwan. FDD’s tracker captures the sharp increase in Chinese activity surrounding Justice Mission-2025 against a broader backdrop of sustained coercion, even as Washington and Beijing maintained the trade framework reached in Busan. A reduction in Chinese activity achieved by limiting support for Taiwan would therefore be a poor measure of genuine stability. The more relevant question is whether Chinese pressure changes Washington’s willingness to help Taiwan build a credible defense. Beijing’s reaction to the December package suggests that Taiwan-specific developments, particularly those that complicate PLA military planning, can matter considerably more to the tempo of Chinese operations than the broader diplomatic atmosphere. 4. China often manufactures its own pretext for military escalation. Not every surge in Chinese military activity around Taiwan follows a U.S. arms sale, political statement, or other external trigger. Beijing increasingly initiates exercises and combat readiness patrols on its own timetable, then uses those operations to rehearse increasingly complex missions around the island. Taiwan’s defense ministry reported that on March 17, 2025, the PLA conducted two joint combat-readiness patrols in a single day for the first time. Two weeks later, the Eastern Theater Command launched large-scale exercises around Taiwan, followed by live-fire drills under Strait Thunder-2025A. Chinese military statements said the operations tested joint warfighting capabilities and would be followed by continued increases in combat readiness training. The pattern matters because Beijing can create its own escalation cycle: The PLA announces a patrol or exercise, deploys aircraft and ships across areas Taiwan once treated as informal buffers, and then incorporates elements of that activity into routine operations. FDD’s tracker captures the result: Bursts of activity occur around identifiable events, but the pressure does not simply disappear when those events pass. Median-line crossings and joint air-maritime operations have become increasingly normalized. Taiwan’s 2025 National Defense Report similarly describes frequent median-line crossings and joint readiness patrols as part of the PLA’s sustained pressure campaign. This is the essence of Beijing’s gray-zone strategy around Taiwan: Repeatedly change facts on the ground without crossing the threshold into war, gradually making yesterday’s escalation look like today’s normal. 5. Trump has delivered significant military and economic support to Taiwan. Any assessment of Trump’s second-term Taiwan policy should account for the scale of support his administration has already approved. The December 2025 arms package for Taiwan is the largest single U.S. weapons package for the island on record. It included High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARs), short-range Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMs), M109A7 self-propelled howitzer tanks, Javelin missiles, drones, and other capabilities intended to strengthen Taiwan’s ability to blunt a Chinese attack. Trump’s second-term arms approvals have already surpassed the total value of approved weapons during President Joe Biden’s four years in office. The broader U.S.-Taiwan relationship has also deepened economically. In January 2026, Washington and Taipei reached a trade agreement under which Taiwanese companies committed $250 billion toward U.S. semiconductor, energy, and artificial-intelligence production, while Taiwan pledged another $250 billion in credit guarantees to support additional investment. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) alone has continued expanding its massive U.S. manufacturing footprint, reinforcing the growing integration of the two economies around advanced technology. These steps do not eliminate the uncertainty surrounding future arms decisions. They do, however, complicate any simple narrative that Trump’s pursuit of accommodation with Beijing has translated into reduced support for Taiwan. Craig Singleton is the senior director of the China Program and a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). Jack Burnham is a senior research analyst with FDD’s China Program. For more analysis from the authors and the China Program, please subscribe HERE. Follow FDD on X @FDD. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.